General McChrystal and Afghanistan

I’ve just read Michael Hastings' Rolling Stone article on General Stanley McChrystal and America’s campaign in Afghanistan that yesterday resulted in his dismissal. It’s honestly been one of the most enjoyable articles I’ve read in weeks. General McChrystal sounds like a formidable Special Forces commander who probably never should have been put in charge of the campaign in Afghanistan. Not because he is unqualified or unsuited for command, but because the civilian authorities appear to be.

The paradox was that on the one hand, the US wanted a counterinsurgency strategy for Afghanistan, but on the other hand wants to do this by minimising civilian casualties and keeping military activities at a minimum. The two goals are admirable, but contradictory, at least in the way they have been translated into policy. For instance, the article described the reaction of troops at Combat Outpost JFM, who have been given laminated cards that say: "Patrol only in areas that you are reasonably certain that you will not have to defend yourselves with lethal force.” I’m trying, and failing, to think what part of Afghanistan that would be.

The article also points out a salient fact: that the main Taliban rear areas in Pakistan have been largely untouched by the ground campaign, except by aerial drone attacks. This means that, just as in Vietnam, the US army is fighting on behalf of a political leader with little apparent authority in his own country, while the enemy’s main force huddles in safety on the other side of the Pakistani border.

Add to this the fact that the surge has been slow in getting off the ground, and that it is timed to end next year. It seems that in terms of strategy, the campaign is bound to fail: all the enemy have to do is remain in the fight. By not losing, they win.

Either the US and its allies need to fight with every means at their disposal, or they need to find a way to reach some accommodation with the Taliban and withdraw. If these two options are unacceptable, then the campaign will continue as it is presently configured: an expensive and inconclusive effort, with no end in sight, and little possibility of victory. Hamid Karzai has come to precisely the latter conclusion, according to recent press reports.

As for General McChrystal: I got the impression of a tremendously competent man, a warrior, who should be out planning missions and kicking down doors than suffering through dinner in Paris. He sounds like a classic Special Forces officer in the impossible and undesirable position of managing a conventional war planned and stage-set from national capitals, against an unconventional enemy that he probably understands better than anyone else.

The “trash talk” so magnified by the press honestly seems insignificant. The group of officers in that hotel room were blowing off the not inconsiderable steam that comes from being in a combat zone. While it’s unfortunate their comments had to be relayed in this way, I’m sure hundreds of thousands of other American citizens, government employees and members of the Armed Forces share similar thoughts.

It’s also interesting to note the double standard at work. None of the comments made by McChrystal or his aides were as vitriolic as those made by one senator against another in the 2008 Presidential race. Or by one senator against the President in a State of the Union speech. Both senators and generals are supposed to be leaders, and both are paid by the government, right?

When do you remember a US senator ever resigning for something they’ve said?

The North Waziristan Conundrum

The New York Times reported today (Pakistan Rebuffs U.S. on Taliban Crackdown) that Pakistan’s army was refusing to open a new front against the 12,000-odd Taleban forces led by Siraj Haqqani, a member of the Quetta shura and erstwhile leader of North Waziristan. Three main reasons are listed for this refusal:

a. Pakistan is already engaged in open warfare in South Waziristan, and cannot afford to open a “third front”;

b. Pakistan’s intelligence service has long had Haqqani as an asset, and is positioning itself for influence in Afghanistan after the US withdraws;

c. Pakistan needs a loyal counterweight to prevent an “encirclement” by India, which is investing $ 1.2 billion in Afghanistan.

It shows just how twisted the logic has become when the article reports that

"It considers Mr. Haqqani and his control of broad swaths of Afghan territory vital to Pakistan in the jostling for influence that will pit Pakistan, India, Russia, China and Iran in the post-American Afghan arena, the Pakistani officials said."

Really? What could be so interesting about Afghanistan that would cause all these countries to “jostl[e] for influence?” Afghanistan has few resources, and conspiracy theories about Caspian Sea oil pipelines aside, there’s practically nothing there worth fighting for. Any benefits will be far less than the costs.

To compound the irony, Siraj Haqqani’s father, Jalalludin Haqqani, received weapons from the CIA, channelled through Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The son is now fighting against his father’s former paymasters.

But leave it to the ISI to come up with a convenient solution:

"Because Mr. Haqqani now spends so much time in Afghanistan — about three weeks of every month, according to a Pakistani security official — if the Americans want to eliminate him, their troops should have ample opportunity to capture him, Pakistani security officials argue."

Yeah, you can find him at the Khost Burger King every Thursday at 19:00.

You have to pity the United States: it bombed it’s way through Afghanistan in 2001, thinking it would be just another quick military campaign. It would now like nothing more than to withdraw, but withdrawing is perhaps a worse option than staying. In the meantime, the US taxpayer channels billions of dollars in aid to Pakistan each year, but sees the Taleban firmly entrenched on Pakistani territory, with no apparent solution to get them out, with the Taleban using this territory as a safe haven from which to attack US forces in Afghanistan. With friends like this, who needs enemies?

At one point in the very near future, it’s clear that public support for continued US and European engagement in Afghanistan will no longer be possible given the multitude of contradictions and fundamental irrationality of the current situation.

The Afghanistan Surge

On December 1st, President Barack Obama took the long-anticipated step of sending an additional 30,000 US combat troops to Afghanistan. This will raise the total US troop commitment to between 100,000 – 105,000 troops, taking into account the 71,000 already in the country. NATO and other allies have an estimated additional 42,000 troops in Afghanistan.

I was struck by the negative reaction by Michael Moore and other liberals. Obama’s actions are somehow seen as a betrayal of core ideals, as war-mongering. Many commentators stated that Obama’s speech could have been delivered by George W. Bush. Take a look at the opening paragraph of Michael Moore’s November 30th letter to Barack Obama:

If you go to West Point tomorrow night (Tuesday, 8pm) and announce that you are increasing, rather than withdrawing, the troops in Afghanistan, you are the new war president. Pure and simple. And with that you will do the worst possible thing you could do -- destroy the hopes and dreams so many millions have placed in you.

Yet a surge of troops in Afghanistan has been a core platform of Obama’s election campaign. The plan to draw down troops from Iraq and re-deploy combat brigades to Afghanistan has been one of his earliest campaign pledges, as his website still shows:

Barack Obama will refocus our efforts on Afghanistan. He has a comprehensive strategy to succeed in Afghanistan with at least two more U.S. combat brigades, more resources and training for the Afghan Army, and a comprehensive development strategy.

What strikes me most of all is that the American public has perhaps finally realised that the war in Afghanistan is increasingly difficult to justify. On the one hand, the elected “government” of the country has lapsed into unbridled corruption and in many cases collusion with the Taleban. On the other hand, the situation in Pakistan is dire, all denials by that country’s government notwithstanding. All these facts have long been known to anyone with even the most cursory interest in the matter.

The costs of a combat deployment of 100,000 US troops in Afghanistan are likely to exceed $ 100 billion per year, using the rule of thumb that each 1,000 troops cost about $ 1 billion. This does not include the costs of replacing or repairing damaged equipment, treating long-term casualties, etc. Taking all associated costs into account, I doubt that this engagement will be any “cheaper” than Iraq, as some commentators have said in recent months.

Another interesting point: the lessons of the Iraq surge have been incorporated into the current plan for Afghanistan. There are resources for development, although these are a small proportion of the amount spent on military operations. There are sufficient analyses and policy statement on the causes of terrorism and extremism, methods of countering them, and ways forward, dating all the way back to the original Afghanistan Compact of 2001.

What remains to be seen is whether the West has the political will and the financial resources to actually implement these lessons. I sincerely doubt that it does, and I do not say this as a means of criticism, but of simple, rational evaluation of costs and benefits.

At one point, the alliance that is fighting in Afghanistan will have to decide whether it can afford to sacrifice men, blood and treasure to this conflict, for which it has no real strategic reason to be in which could not be better addressed by other means.

My feeling is that this point occurred in 2005-2006 for the majority of countries involved. It is only the self-interest of individual politicians that has sustained the level of troop commitment until now.

My predictions for the next two years: the surge will partially succeed, but 18 months will not be enough to create the conditions for lasting peace and prosperity needed to provide stability to Afghanistan. In contrast, the Taleban and Al Qaeda will play a waiting game in this time until political costs force the inevitable retreat of western troops.

In these 18 months, we will see higher casualties from IEDs and other indirect attacks than by open combat between western and Taleban units, and we will see that even 30,000 additional troops will not be able to “clear and hold” the ground in the south east of Afghanistan. The 1,500 mile border with Pakistan will continue to be porous. Despite active combat operations, I expect US fatalities to remain [relatively] low in this period, perhaps on the order of 150-200 troops.

Conditions in Pakistan and Afghanistan will deteriorate in terms of governance and political involvement. In Afghanistan, I doubt President Karzai will make any meaningful reform of the public sector or the involvement of warlords in governing the country. He will probably use every opportunity to criticize the west to detract attention from the real problems of the country. He will become increasingly despised and denigrated in the western media.

In Pakistan, I would not at all be surprised to see a new military dictatorship within the next 24 months, either in open or concealed form, and a new arrangement reached with Taleban groups to halt open warfare between the Pakistani Army and the Taleban. It is regrettable that neither Presidents Karzai or Zardari appear to be able to unify their own countries, at least in terms acceptable to western public opinion. But there are no easy answers to this issue.

The ultimate question is: “Is it worth it?” The easy answer is “no.” Bringing peace and stability to this area will take at least 25 years and civilian spending of at least $ 25-30 billion per year in excess of military spending. I don’t see any signs that anyone in the West is prepared for such a commitment, and indeed, most countries are considering their exit options. The US surge itself has a built-in expiration date.

However, you also have to ask what other options exist. Are we really prepared to exit Afghanistan and usher in a new dark age as the country sinks back into the pre-Taleban, Somali-like condition it was in before the Taleban consolidated control? What happens to Pakistan, and its 100-odd nuclear warheads? What happens to neighbouring countries such as Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan, which will be the next dominos to fall?

Difficult questions to answer. No such discussion can make up for even one life lost. On the other hand, very few such discussions highlight the good taking place on the ground in Afghanistan by international development efforts, or outline what should be done to expand these efforts so that within a generation, they can provide a lasting effect.

We seem once again condemned to launch grand initiatives destined to end in failure. Is the right course to try in the face of overwhelming odds, spending hundreds of billions of dollars and “sacrificing” hundreds of lives? Or to withdraw in the face of overwhelming odds, thus spending tens of billions of dollars and condemning thousands of lives to death and repression?

Stranger, spare a thought for Afghanistan

The FT’s Editorial Comment on Afghanistan ("Afghan Harvest," August 27th, 2008) paints a grim, succinct picture of the role of economic development and security in that country, and why the struggle for security may fail.

In a nutshell, conditions in Afghanistan are deteriorating. The Taliban and its sponsors have taken a page from classic insurgency strategy, and are interdicting convoys carrying fuel, food and humanitarian aid from Kabul to the south. The recent attack on French paratroopers 40 miles from Kabul is another indication of their ability to strike at will throughout the country. If this reminds anyone of the Viet Cong strategy in Vietnam, it should be no surprise.

Afghanistan is a country of some 38 million people, 80% of whom are Sunni, and divided into over 30 major ethnic groups, of which the Pashtun and Tadjik are estimated as the largest. The terrain is extremely rugged, and transport links are vital to assuring basic economic activity. It is one of the poorest countries in the world, and among the least developed on the UNDP's Human Development Index , when it is ranked at all.

In this environment, it should come as no surprise that the conditions for insurgency are flourishing. The Taliban has maintained its fundamental attractiveness as a political, social and religious force among a significant segment of the Afghan population, particularly in the Pashtun-dominated south-east of the country, bordering Pakistan. The actions of the US-led NATO alliance appear to be fanning the flames of the insurgency, either through brutal air assaults which lead to high “collateral damage” among civilians, or due to the humiliating way in which most military patrols interact with civilians.

For a review of the latter, just turn on CNN and watch how the average military patrol speaks with, frisks and detains Afghans. In a culture where possession of firearms is not only a necessity, but a cultural heritage, the fact that someone can be arrested apparently for possessing a firearm is slightly absurd. Beyond this, the fact that these people are searched, at gunpoint, in full view of other males and occasionally females, must go against every cultural and social tenet in the book. In other words, it’s a major humiliation, in a country where wars have been started for less.

There is no easy solution to this specific problem, and I don’t raise it with an alternative solution in mind. The key to defeating an insurgency is security, which would allow the conditions for economic growth, political engagement and social modernisation. Although the Afghanistan Compact provides a well-thought, well-intentioned strategic framework for doing so, it’s clear that the implementation of this framework is not sufficiently resourced.

Consider that the Afghanistan Compact provides for three key pillars of activity:

1. Security
2. Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights
3. Economic and Social Development

In this post, I will focus primarily on the first pillar, security, since without it the remaining two pillars will be impossible to achieve. This is also an issue of prime importance, since it affects decisions made in the current US Presidential election, as well as long-term issues in international security.

In the last 2 years, the Taliban have regrouped and taken the fight to major population centres outside the south-west of the country. They are interdicting the major transport axes to and from Kabul, and are mounting attacks against major military bases and within Kabul itself. In 2007, for instance, the Taliban launched a suicide bombing attack outside Bagram air base during Vice President Cheney’s visit. The number of US and ISAF casualties in Afghanistan has been rising, and US casualties are surfacing as a sound bite in US political coverage.

There are a number of root causes to government's inability to control security:

Insufficient Troops
There are not enough ISAF or Afghan boots on the ground to provide security and defeat the insurgency. ISAF reports a total of 52,700 troops, including National Support Elements. According to the Congressional Research Service (report available from the Federation of American Scientists), the US has a total of 48,250 troops deployed in-country as of June 1, 2008, of which about 60% are tasked to ISAF, with the remainder of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Assuming that 52,700 ISAF troops are joined by the 40% of US troops in OEF (19,300 troops), then there are a total of 72,000 western troops in-country. Of these, a number of German, French and other troops contributing to ISAF are stationed in the north of Afghanistan, and are not deployable to conflict regions. To this, we can add the 46,000 troops of the Afghan National Army forces, but these are widely acknowledged to be insufficient for independent command.

An Unknown Enemy
We can only define a number of troops as “insufficient” if we know the nature and deployment of the enemy they are confronting. Here, unfortunately, we are operating in the dark. The Taliban enjoys apparently unlimited ability to deploy its forces, either from its strongholds across the border in Pakistan, or from its bases within Afghan territory. According to a 2007 article in the New York Times, there are approximately 10,000 Taliban insurgents, of which 2,000 – 3,000 are committed, motivated fighters. The Senlis Council estimated that the Taliban controlled approximately 54% of Afghanistan’s territory in November 2007. The Taliban’s leadership is widely reported to be based in Pakistan, which itself appears to be undergoing a rapid melt-down of national government authority, at least in the Tribal Areas.

Regional Enemies and Safe Havens
Afghanistan’s neighbours, primarily Iran and Pakistan, can hardly be considered friendly states. US security services have accused Iran of supporting the Taliban, particularly through provision of weapons and expertise. Although these charges have not been sufficiently proven, the fact that Iran is following an active strategy against US interests in Iraq and the Persian Gulf indicates that its role could easily change: Iran holds the initiative on the border, not the Afghan government.

The New York Times recently reported a meeting between the CIA and the new Pakistani Prime Minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani, about the ISI’s support for the Taliban attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul. It’s also clear that although Pakistan has been trying to impose central government control on the so-called Tribal Areas, it has been failing. The government has lost any number of military engagements in the region, and the Pakistani Taliban has shown that it is up to the task of defeating government forces on its own territory. Whatever the case, the fact that both Iran and Pakistan are, de facto or de jure, hostile towards the United States (in the former case) and of Afghanistan (in the latter) indicates that the Taliban insurgency has a safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks in the country.

Opium
Perhaps the final element in the security situation is the cultivation of the opium poppy, which provides not only a high value crop for Afghan farmers, but finances the Taliban. Although recent reports indicate that the opium harvest is declining, with poppy cultivation down 19% over 2007, the laws of supply and demand mean that the Taliban will, if anything, gain income as prices rise in response to diminished supply. In the absence of foreign sponsors, the cultivation, processing and trafficking of opium provides a constant and reliable source of income, which until now neither ISAF, nor the UN, the Afghan government nor Operational Enduring Freedom have managed to shut down. Indeed, opium production is fuelling government corruption, with many reports questioning President Hamid Karzai’s inability to stop the trade.

The scale of the root causes of the security issue cannot be underestimated, and are complex. To define the Taliban as a group of ignorant Islamic fanatics is to confuse the issue, rather than to illuminate it. The Taliban’s religious and political philosophy, no matter how much we may disagree with it, is profoundly rooted in regional culture, history and current events. To “win hearts and minds” will be extremely difficult in the current situation, far more difficult than in Iraq, which can build on successive generations of secularism under Saddam Hussein and prior rulers.

Into this maelstrom, both US Presidential candidates, as well as President George W. Bush, have resolved to send more troops. Barack Obama has mentioned two combat brigades – about 7,000 troops – to Afghanistan. John McCain wants to send three additional brigades. President George W. Bush has announced plans to increase the troop commitment to Afghanistan as well, although this is contingent on the draw-down following the surge in Iraq.

Additional forces are welcome: there is no doubt about this. Yet this will certainly not be enough: a generation of international assistance for the second and third pillars of the Afghanistan Compact will be needed.

I wonder as well if the political dimensions of the Afghan conflict are being properly addressed, or even though about. The US-led troop presence of Afghanistan has now nearly completed 7 years since the original invasion in October 2001, following the Al Qaeda attack on the World Trade Centre on September 11th. As recounted in this article, the Taliban insurgency has gained ground in recent years. This leads me to raise a series of questions, particularly since I’m tired of hearing the bromide that “Afghanistan is too important to fail”:

1. How do we define success or failure?
2. What scenarios exist for success or failure in Afghanistan?
3. What drivers and barriers exist to success (and failure)?
4. What price is appropriate for assuring that Afghanistan succeeds?
5. Are we prepared to pay this price?

This is a highly complex subject, and requires extensive further reporting. But for the time being, if anyone is interested in this subject, I invite you to check the websites of the two candidates – Barack Obama and John McCain, and consider whether this is receiving anything near the attention is should be. The Obama campaign doesn’t even have a page on Afghanistan (although it does have pages on Iran and Iraq); John McCain’s campaign also lacks a page on Afghanistan, although it has issued a press release.

As with many other issues in this Presidential Campaign, we are hearing promises with something approaching blithe indifference to conditions on the ground, root causes and likely approaches needed to bring about a solution. I would not be surprised if four years from today, in September 2012, we are hearing the very same promises from two different candidates.