Wolfgang Muenchau has it exactly right on European policy towards Turkey and refugees

Wolfgang Muenchau has written a powerful article in the Financial Times which accurately describes what many of us in Greece and Cyprus are feeling.

The EU sells its soul to strike a deal with Turkey (March 20, 2016), he writes: 

The EU had two assets I have always considered un­assailable, however much I may have questioned various decisions. The first is a lack of alternatives. How else can Europeans confront climate change, a refugee crisis or an over-assertive Russian president if not through the EU?

The second is the moral high ground. Compared with the majority of its member states, the EU is less corrupt, more principled and rules-driven. Whereas the world of national politics is full of tacticians out to seek short-term gain, the bloc manages a better mix of politics and policies. It builds broad coalitions and formulates strategic policy objectives. Its horizon extends beyond the life of a parliament.

                       

Within a few years those assets have been demolished. The mismanagement of the eurozone crisis made it possible to formulate a rational economic argument for an exit.

Then, on Friday the EU lost its other key asset. The deal with Turkey is as sordid as anything I have seen in modern European politics. On the day that EU leaders signed the deal, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish president, gave the game away: “Democracy, freedom and the rule of law . . . For us, these words have absolutely no value any longer.” At that point, the European Council should have ended the conversation with Ahmet Davutoglu, the Turkish prime minister, and sent him home. But instead they made a deal with him — money and a lot more in return for help with the refugee crisis.

I find it interesting to what extent the European Commission has been bending over backwards to accommodate Angela Merkel's decision to open Germany's borders last year. Once again, another European decision is being made which:

• Contradicts earlier decisions and international treaties.
• Rewards Turkey for illegal activities occurring on its own soil, that the country has made few substantive attempts to interdict. I refer here to human trafficking, smuggling and the vast and obvious commercial presence built up around the process of moving hundreds of thousands of refugees and migrants at key points on Turkey's Aegean coastline.
• Ignores the very visible human trafficking and smuggling operations on Turkish and Greek soil, instead deploying a bureaucracy-heavy mechanism to address a problem without understanding its commercial basis. 
• Rewards Turkey by re-opening accession chapters, despite the fact that Turkey is--according to UN decision and international law--militarily occupying the territory of an EU Member State (Cyprus), which it also refuses to recognise. 
• Promises visa-free travel for Turkish citizens into Europe without even the semblance of a democratic decision among European voters.

As Muenchau writes, this deal is both sordid and probably cannot be implemented. And it definitely calls into question why sovereignty should be shared, given the repeated, biased and catastrophic errors in European policy-making.

(c) Philip Ammerman, 2016

Reactions to an FT article on Cyprus

I returned from a consulting trip to Istanbul this evening to read what must be one of the worse articles ever published in the Financial Times.

My critique of the article, Cyprus juggles EU and Russian support, is based purely on facts, and I hope it will be interpreted by the readers of this blog as such.

The article makes its bias clear from the first two paragraphs: 

If European leaders hoped Cyprus would use its turn at the helm of the EU’s rotating presidency to signal a break from its longtime benefactors in Moscow, the country’s Russian-educated communist president made clear on Thursday they would be disappointed.

A week after becoming the fifth eurozone country to seek a bailout from Brussels, Demetris Christofias said his government would continue to seek rescue loans from the Kremlin – in essence, playing one potential creditor off the other.

While Cyprus has requested European Union support, no offer has been made yet. A “Troika” evaluation mission to Nicosia started this week, but the complete package will not be defined for some weeks to come.

Given that neither Russia nor the Troika are “bidding” to lend money to Cyprus, I fail to see how this amounts to playing one creditor off against the other.

Cyprus is following multiple courses of action to redress its urgent financial problems, which mainly involve bank recapitalisation. As a sovereign country, it has every right and indeed the responsibility to do so.

The German bilateral relationship with Russia is far stronger in terms of trade, investment and gas (see for instance former Chancellor Gerhard Schroder’s chairmanship of North Stream). If we apply the author’s logic to Germany, should we understand that Germany too needs to separate itself from “longtime benefactors in Moscow?”

It’s also worthwhile noting that there are far more Cypriots studying and working in the UK than in Russia, and far more British citizens living and visiting Cyprus each year than Russians. Britain maintains two sovereign military bases in the Republic of Cyprus with 3,500 troops stationed there. I therefore have to question the systematic attempt to demonize Russia in this article, or for that matter, the Cypriot relationship with Russia.

The author also misstates the facts of Cyprus’s relationship with Turkey:

Cyprus has not only blocked progress on Turkey’s membership of the EU but it has prevented the EU from working more closely with Nato to co-ordinate European defence policies.

This statement is both factually wrong and misleading:

·    It is wrong in that the Cypriot veto over Turkey’s membership in the European Defence Agency has prompted Turkey’s veto of EU coordination with NATO. Cyprus is not blocking EU coordination with NATO—Turkey is. This is an elementary fact which should have been checked prior to publication.

·    It is misleading because it fails to mention that via the Ankara Declaration, Turkey neither recognises the Republic of Cyprus, nor has it opened its ports and airports to Cypriot ships or airplanes. This is what has prompted Cyprus to veto Turkish membership in the EDA, but has also prompted the European Union to freeze negotiations on 8 chapters of the Acquis communautaire.

·    It fails to include the fact that Nicholas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel have both called for an alternative membership status for Turkey, and that this too has played a negative political role in Turkey’s EU accession process.

The German Foreign Ministry does a far better job of explaining the current status of Turkey’s accession negotiations:

When a large number of Central and Eastern European countries joined the EU in 2004, it became necessary to include them in the EU-Turkish customs union. To that end, the Ankara Protocol, an additional protocol to the Ankara Agreement, was signed on 29 July 2005. Turkey issued a declaration expressing its continuing non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus and explicitly excluding Cyprus from the customs union. The European Union issued a counter-declaration rejecting this interpretation and thus re establishing the obligation to include the Republic of Cyprus without exception. Turkey is nonetheless still failing to uphold the free movement of goods created within the customs union in the form of free access to Turkish territory for Cypriot ships, aircraft and heavy goods vehicles. The Council of the European Union has repeatedly criticized this treaty violation, deciding in December 2006 on a partial suspension of accession negotiations. Until the Cyprus conflict is resolved and Turkey implements the Ankara Protocol without discrimination, eight chapters in the negotiations will remain unopened and no chapter will be closed. Because of the continuing lack of progress on the implementation of the Ankara Protocol, the Council has renewed this decision annually since 2006.

In reference to President Christofias’ comments on Turkey, it fails to mention that these occur in the backdrop of Turkish threats against Cypriot oil and gas exploration or the Turkish intention to freeze relations with the EU over the Cypriot presidency.

I bring up these facts solely to illustrate the full picture—not to justify the political decisions on any side which has led Turkey and Cyprus into this regrettable situation.

I honestly have to question how an article with such visible bias, and with such a one-sided view of the situation, can be published in the Financial Times, particularly coming at the beginning of the Cypriot EU Presidency.

I've had the enormous privilege of working over the years in all three countries: Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey. Through my work, I've interacted with thousands of business owners and managers in this time, as well as journalists, NGO members, government officials, and many others. 

Like many others, I believe that Greece, Turkey and Cyprus have more to gain from working together constructively and peacefully rather than engendering a permanent state of military and political aggression. Geographic reality, together with our shared culture and our tremendous economic synergies and potential should make that obvious to anyone.

What should also be obvious are that while there are serious problems on all sides of the political equation, well-meaning partners could solve these if we would put aside the vested interests, stereotypes, political posturing and the bitter memories of the past, and concentrate on our shared—and inevitable—future.

This would require a rational, post-nationalistic approach to policy, which I believe citizens in all three countries are ready for, and indeed would welcome. I have particular hopes that the positive impacts of globalisation and mobility, and the common interests of younger generations will one day make this vision a reality.

Unfortunately, articles like this do more to encourage misconceptions and hostility than to present an accurate and objective picture of current affairs.

A list of sources follows for anyone interested in a more complete picture of the political situation between Cyprus and Turkey.

© Philip Ammerman, 2012

Turkey rejects EU Cyprus Proposals (Hurriyet Daily News)

http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/10302092.asp

Between the European Union and NATO, Many Walls (New York Times)

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/25/world/europe/25iht-letter.html

EU Enlargement: Turkey. (Germany Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Europa/Erweiterung/Tuerkei_node.html

European Union Accession: A Status Report on Turkey’s Accession Process. (US Congressional Research Service)

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22517.pdf

Turkey not fit for EU accession: Sarkozy. (Deutsche Welle)

http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,14875593,00.html

Merkel calls for petition against EU Membership (Deutsche Welle)

http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,1356052,00.html

Nord Stream AG (Wikipedia)

http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nord_Stream_AG

Cyprus, Turkey spar over gas drilling (Reuters)

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/13/cyprus-turkey-hydrocarbons-idUSL5E7KD2CJ20110913

Turkey to freeze EU ties if Cyprus gets EU Presidency (Reuters)

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/18/us-turkey-cyprus-idUSTRE78H20L20110918

Turkey’s Strategy in the Aegean Sea

Stavros Lygeros published an excellent opinion letter, Dangerous Precedents, in the English version of the Kathimerini today. He recounts that:

"Turkish provocations are not circumstantial but rather reflect long-term strategic plans. On 29 January, 1996, Turkey included the above three islands (as well as Pserimos) in the same category as the Imia islets. A few days later, then Prime Minister Tansu Ciller said that she would raise the issue of some 1,000 islets. “So far, Turkey subconsciously accepted that these islands practically belong to Greece. We are going to change that,” she told Hurriyet at the time."

We can expect further tensions between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus this year:

a. The negotiations between the government of the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish-Cypriot authorities representing the occupied part of Cyprus are likely to reach some form of preliminary conclusion if the process is to be continued.

b. By December, Turkey will have to open its national ports and airports to Cypriot-flagged vessels and airplanes under its terms of the Accession negotiations with the European Union. So far, it has been in blatant violation of the basic terms of Accession: not only does it discriminate against EU member states, but it is occupying nearly 40% of the territory of one of them.

c. The domestic political scene continues to evolve, with the AK party seeking to consolidate power, and the armed forces responding in the face of the highly embarrassing Ergenekon coup network. It remains to be seen what information will still see the light of day.

d. The Turkish economic situation is declining rapidly, yet the government is delaying negotiations with the IMF and delaying a quick adjustment to the situation. A significant share of the population is feeling the impact of the credit crisis and the fall in tourism and construction, as well as the declining job markets in the EU, where many Turkish migrant workers are based. The AK party is not reacting as well as it perhaps should to the crisis: on the other hand, there are few credible political alternatives.

In the midst of this contradictory policy, Turkey seeks to convince the world it is a peaceful partner. Its actual record in terms of foreign policy suggests something entirely different. Greece has to take urgent measures, supported by the entire Hellenic diaspora, to affirm Greek sovereignty over its territory. This issue cannot be swept under the rug of wishful thinking: it will only grow with time, until the crisis point is reached.