Showing posts with label Current Events - Balkans. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Current Events - Balkans. Show all posts

Friday, 29 May 2015

Launching BestInvest: Cyprus Investment Conference and Exhibition

In association with Cyprus-Russian Business, Navigator is pleased to announce the launch of the BestInvest Cyprus, an investment exhibition and conference focusing on Cyprus. The conference will take place at the Four Seasons Hotel in Limassol on 18-20 October 2015.
In March 2013, Cyprus became the fourth Eurozone country to receive emergency financial assistance, touching off a recession. With economic growth now resuming and major new investments now launched, the BestInvest Conference provides investors and policy-makers with a detailed and informed update of investment projects and opportunities in Cyprus.

The Conference Agenda
The BestInvest Conference is a 1-day event providing a balanced and comprehensive assessment of the Cyprus economy and investment opportunities. It is oriented towards practitioners and provides a state-of-the-art review of main issues and opportunities.

The Investor Delegation
A key differentiator of BestInvest Cyprus is our focus on attracting investors to Cyprus. Accordingly, we have arranged for an Investor Delegation, comprising group of leading investment funds, high net worth individuals and other qualified investors. Contact us if you would like to participate as an Investor.

The Investment Exhibition
A key part of the BestInvest Cyprus is the Investment Exhibition, comprising 20 exhibition stands featuring investment projects from vetted investment sponsors. The Exhibition will be open to the public and will take place on 18-19 October. Contact us if you would like to participate as an exhibitor.

The Investment Project Site Visits
In order to view investment opportunities in Cyprus, Site Visits have been organised for the BestInvest participants. There will be two field trips scheduled: to Eastern and Western Cyprus. View the Site Visit schedules here. Register for a Site Visit.

Conference Organisers
The BestInvest Cyprus conference is organised by two partners with an in-depth and impartial understanding of the Cyprus investment climate and economy:
  • The Successful Business Magazine was founded in 2010 by the Vestnik Kipri media organization. Successful Business provides a quarterly analysis of Cyprus political, economic, financial and business developments and is considered mandatory reading for all analysts and executives operating in or addressing Cyprus today.
  • Navigator Consulting Partners is an investment advisory consultancy with in-depth experience in Cyprus since 1995. Navigator provides a range of consultancy services, including due diligence, investment analysis, financial planning, business planning and risk analysis, and has in-depth experience in tourism, hotel investments, food and beverage, property, renewable energy and other relevant sectors.

For further information, please Contact Us.

A conference website is coming soon. Additional information can be found on our Events page: Navigator Events: BestInvest Cyprus

Monday, 13 February 2012

Greece passes the new Memorandum


Voting has started on the latest bail-out memorandum in the Greek Parliament. Prime Minister Papademos just gave a reasoned yet stirring speech that was greeted with applause. MPs are voting “yes to all” or “no to all”.

So far, the main PASOK deputies – Papoutsis, Diamantopoulou – have voted yes to all.

Dora Dora Bakoyianni voted yes. Procopis Pavlopoulos voted yes. Kaklamanis voted yes.

Some big names from PASOK voted no: Vasso Papandreou, Louka Katselli, Milena Apostolaki and Marileza Xenogiannakopoulou voted no. Eliza Vozenberg voted no. All the far-left parties voted no.

Few defections. The yes votes are overwhelming.

George Karatzaferis, the LAOS leader, is absent – no vote. Only Georgiades and Vorides from LAOS voted yes: all other LAOS deputies were absent. There are about 20 defections from ND and 20 defections from PASOK. All "no" voters are to be disbarred from each party, according to speeches made by George Papandreou and Antonis Samaras earlier tonight. 

Mega TV is running the vote on a right-hand screen, and on the left, footage of the rioters in Constitutions Square, right below the Plaza Hotel, on the corner where the Public store is located. It seem impossible that 30-40 young hooligans can’t be caught.

The new memorandum passes – most likely with about 200 votes.

© Philip Ammerman, 2012 
Navigator Consulting Group

Thursday, 30 July 2009

Dear Mr. Whitlock,

Thank you for responding to my email: I appreciate the consideration of your response.

I have re-read your article carefully in light of your comments, and you will permit me to reaffirm that the article is biased and one-sided. Taking only the final quotation of your article is a case in point:

"The Greeks are sorry that they are called Greece and not Macedonia," he said. "What else can I tell you?"

There is certainly no equivalent statement from a Greek source in the article. Given its arrogance and utter lack of relevance, it is better that there is not.

This pattern is repeated consistently in the article: inflammatory statements by FYROM officials: no rebuttal from a Greek official; no balance or disclaimer from the author of the article.
Mr. Gjorge Ivanov, is quoted as saying that "The pressure that Greece is making is destabilizing the whole region." This is not the case: the region (which I presume refers to the Balkan region) is hardly being destabilised by Greece’s stance on FYROM’s entry into NATO or the EU. In contrast, it’s support for Bulgaria’s and Romania’s entry into the EU and NATO (which have already occurred) and its support for Croatian and Turkish future entry into the EU, are matters of public record. Greece supports FYROM’s entry into NATO and EU, subject to a mutual and satisfactory resolution of the name issue. Regrettably, you do not publish a qualifier in your article, nor do you permit the Greek side to make a response which would balance this statement.

Mr Todor Petrov is quoted as accusing Greece of ‘"practicing ethnic cleansing and genocide on the Macedonian nation" for the past 100 years. "They're denying our nationality and culture and church and history and our borders," he said.’ This is certainly not the case, since there has not been a “Macedonian nation” in the past 100 years. Again, there is no response, or balance from the article.

Mr. Pavle Voskopoulos is quoted as describing Greece as a ‘“country subscribes to a myth of a "pure" Greek people who are directly descended from Alexander and others from his era. "This is all about modern Greek identity," he said. "If there is a Macedonia as an independent state, this is a great threat against Greek policy and Greek ideology.”’ This is hardly the case, but again, there is no response, or balance from the article.

I do consider these statements errata, in other words, “factual mistakes”, which contribute to a regrettably biased and unbalanced article, as I understand the meanings of these terms.

I await the day The Washington Post publishes an equivalent article expressing the Greek view of the situation.

Sincerely yours,

Philip Ammerman

Craig Whitlock responds

Dear Mr. Ammerman,

Thanks for the note and for taking the time to write, though of course I'm sorry you didn't like the article.

You make a good point and raise a legitimate question about why the article quoted so many people from Skopje, as opposed to sources from Greece. Please allow me to explain.

The purpose of reporting the story primarily from Skopje was to illustrate how the "name issue" is affecting politics and life in general in the Republic of Macedonia. After all, the issue in question pertains to that country's name, and their people are the ones who have been unable to join NATO and are feeling the ramifications of this. I am sure that passions regarding the "name issue" are felt just as strongly in Greece, but I sincerely doubt that the dispute has had the same effect on the Greek economy or diplomatic relations between Athens and the rest of the world.

That said, please don't misunderstand: the Post is not taking sides in the conflict. Just because I interviewed and quoted more people in Skopje than in Greece doesn't mean that I or the newspaper endorse their views.

If you or others find their comments objectionable, that's more than OK -- we like our readers to make up their own minds about an issue. For example, it's perfectly legitimate for you to question the assertions by Macedonian officials that the name issue threatens the internal stability of the country. But several people in Skopje -- on all sides of the name issue, including some who think the Alexander campaign is silly -- mentioned it as a real possibility to me. I think it would be disingenuous to ignore their viewpoints just because others might not agree.

Just because the article quoted more people from the Republic of Macedonia than from Greece does not mean that the story was unbalanced. I strongly believe that the article did present and summarize the position of the Greek government and cited its perspective on the name issue. In fact, most of the itemized points you raised in your email are, in fact, addressed in the article in some form.

In your email, you assert that the article contained "errata" and misrepresentations. It seems to me that you do not cite any specific factual mistakes, but rather just don't like how the article was written and presented. I certainly respect your opinions and understand that you may have written the article differently. But I was careful with the facts and stand behind how they were reported in my story.

With best regards,



Craig Whitlock
Berlin bureau chief
The Washington Post

Tuesday, 28 July 2009

Errata in Craig Witlock’s Article: Another Rift between Greece, Macedonia

Craig Witlock’s articles in the Washington Post, Another Rift Between Greece, Macedonia Both Lay Claim to Alexander the Great, of July 28th is hardly an objective piece of reporting.

I find it highly questionable, for instance, that Mr. Witlock refers to no less than 6 pro-FYROM sources in the article (Foreign Minister Antonio Milososki; President Gjorge Ivanov, opposition leader Menduh Tachi; Todor Petrov, president of the World Macedonian Congress; Pavle Voskopoulos, leader of the pro-“Macedonian” Rainbow Party; and Mr. Pasko Kuzman, the FYROM’s Director of Cultural Heritage), versus only only pro-Greek source: Deputy Foreign Minister Yannis Valinakis. This is hardly an objective or balanced composition of sources, and I wonder at the validity of the Washington Post’s editorial policy that allowed this.

Beyond this, there are a number of salient facts which are omitted, while other crucial misrepresentations—not to say, propaganda—are accepted as fact:

1. In contrast to the avowed peaceful intentions expressed by the FYROM side, a number of maps, textbook content and speeches in FYROM have made reference to a “Greater Macedonia.” This refers to a Slavic-speaking “Macedonian” political entity which includes parts of the Greek province of Macedonia, including the city of Thessaloniki, as well as parts of Bulgaria. While these had their origin in Tito’s Yugoslavia, and were in part a Soviet attempt to destabilise Greece during the Greek Civil War, their continuation in FYROM on a number of instances since 1991 are regrettable.

2. The argument that Greece is destabilising the region by refusing FYROM entry into NATO is disingenuous, and incorrect. The conflict between the Slavic majority and the Albanian minority in FYROM is an internal matter, and stems from the government’s treatment of the Albanian minority in the recent past. It has nothing whatsoever to do with Greece, or NATO. The article neglects to mention that Greece supported the NATO peacekeeping force in FYROM, and that it has made its general support for FYROM’s entry—subject to a mutual resolution of the name issue—a matter of public record. The article also fails to note that Greece has publicly supported the candidacies of Bulgaria, Romania and other Balkan countries to both NATO and the European Union.

3. Historically speaking, Alexander the Great and his father, Philip II of Macedon, spoke a dialect of Doric Greek. There are over 6,000 inscriptions, epigraphs, coins and other artefacts in museums all over the world as well as the archaeological sites of Pella or Vergina which attest to this. The citizens of FYROM speak an entirely different language, which could be termed “Slavic”. There is absolutely no historical continuity between the Hellenic/Hellenistic culture and influence of the ancient Kingdom of Macedon, and the current state of FYROM.

4. Whether or not the government of Greece recognises the existence of ethnic minorities within its borders is besides the point. In fact, minorities are recognised in Greece, as national policies regarding the Roma or ethnic-Turkish minorities indicate. But this has literally nothing to do with the attempt to create a “Macedonian” cultural identity based on Alexander the Great that is currently taking place in FYROM, or the naturally opposing reaction of that country’s ethnic Albanian minority.

The policy of Greece is to negotiate with FYROM until a mutually-acceptable, exclusive name is found: This has been the Greek position for over 15 years now, and has been clearly and repeatedly expressed by successive governments. Greece joined NATO in 1951, and the EU in 1981, and has made major contributions to both organisations. I see no reason why both Greek policy and history should be challenged or indeed misrepresented in an article which is so biased and one-sided, unless of course the Washington Post has decided to change its long-standing journalistic and editorial policy.

Thursday, 13 March 2008

The Naming of FYR Macedonia

This entry is posted in response to the Washington Post's editorial: NATO's European Mission

The Yugoslav province of "Macedonia" was created by Josip Broz Tito in 1944-1945. Prior to this, the area was known as Vardarska, as is attested by maps from this time. The Yugoslav "Socialist Republic of Macedonia" was declared in 1946.

This province was re-named partly with the ulterior aim of expanding the Soviet Union's sphere of influence over northern Greece following WWII. The split between leftist and rightist resistance groups to Nazi Occupation in Greece was long-standing, and the struggle for post-war Greece between the Anglo-American powers, led by Britain, and the Soviet Bloc, had already begun.

For the Greek government and its citizens, the issue of the name cannot be separated from the history of claims made by "Macedonian" irridentists to Greek territory and, indeed, culture. There are several maps published in FYR Macedonia showing their territory to include not only within its current borders, but including parts of Greece and Bulgaria.

The engineered attempt to create a cultural identity by claiming kinship with Alexander the Great only serves to exacerbate the territorial issue. The government of FYR Macedonia recently re-named its airport "Alexander the Great." There is a "Pella Square" and reproductions of Hellenistic statues in Skopje. School textbooks purport that the citizens of FYR Macedonia are in some way descendants of Alexander the Great.

There is no archaeological evidence to support such claims. The current language of FYR Macedonia, for instance, is of Slavic-Bulgarian origin. The major sites of Alexander the Great’s kingdom – Pella, Stagira, Aegea, Dion – are defined by their Hellenic and Hellenistic influences and inscriptions in Greek. Alexander the Great spoke Greek and was raised in Hellenic culture: his tutors included Aristotle, his claim to lead the Hellenic city states against Persia was based on this common culture.

The current debate (which extends back to before 1990) therefore does not allow the Greek government or its people to relinquish its culture, history or heritage, and nor should it. While we have no objection to the cultural identity to FYR Macedonia, that government's deliberate attempt to create a new cultural identity by expropriating ours is disconcerting, given all the historical evidence to the contrary, as well as given the territorial claims and past behaviour of that country.

Since this matter arose in the early 1990s, Greece has consistently pushed for a solution which differentiates the legal identities of FYR Macedonia and the Greek province of Macedonia. This is not an unreasonable demand, and stems solely from the insistence of FYR Macedonia (and the ex-Yugoslavia) on expropriating Greek culture and history, and publishing maps showing a “Greater Macedonia.”

Greece has been a member of NATO since 1952 and of the EU since 1981. It is a leading foreign investor and employer in FYR Macedonia, and has supported FYR Macedonia's application to join both institutions, providing a solution to the issue of the name can be found. Greece has, for instance, supported the deployment of NATO troops during FYR Macedonia's ethnic Albanian problems in the late 1990s, and has approved the signing of the pre-accession agreements with the EU.

Membership in both NATO and the EU imply both good relations and the adoption of European values. Yet FYR Macedonia’s recreation of history continues in a hostile manner which would provoke any neighbour.

Its unwillingness to negotiate over a vital issue for Greece – its neighbour and partner – is arrogant and unprecedented. This problem is of the FYR Macedonian government’s own making, and it is up to that government to negotiate a solution acceptable to both sides.

Friday, 22 February 2008

The Problem of Kosovo

Yesterday evening, 21 February, a mob attacked the US Embassy in Belgrade, burning part of the Chancery. The US reaction was predictable. Sean McCormack, State Department spokesman stated that:

"…they [the Serbian government] bear a responsibility to ensure that there is not, on the part of their ministers and their officials, an incitement of violence. We have seen a lot of disturbing reports about statements by Serbian Government officials, even including a minister, about incitement to violence. That has to cease."

According to CNN, Richard Holbrooke stated that "The fact that (independence has) not happened as peacefully as people had hoped is the direct result of the incitement to violence by extremist elements in Belgrade, implicitly and privately supported by the Russians." Zalmay Khalilzad, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, expressed outrage at the "mob attack,” and plans to introduce a UN resolution condemning the attack.

This whole episode puts the shear absurdity, not to say illegality, of US foreign policy into perspective. The US has just led the process of encouraging Kosovo to independence, leading to the loss of some 17% of Serbian territory which plays a critical role in Serbian culture and history. And now the US is introducing a resolution condemning an attack on its Embassy, in which no US personnel were killed, and no permanent damage incurred?

How much more hypocritical will our foreign policy become? I’m not disputing the sovereign nature of the US Embassy and the inviolability of diplomatic representation. But to condemn the Serbs-who have just lost a huge chunk of territory and culture-and preach about international law at this point is ludicrous, not just in light of what is happening in Kosovo, but in light of the Iraq invasion, Guantanamo Bay, warrantless wiretapping, waterboarding, and extraordinary rendition.

Let’s look quickly at the legal situation in Kosovo. On 10 June 1999, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1244, which calls for the cessation of violence, the withdrawal of Yugoslav armed forces, the disarmament of the Kosovo Liberation Army, and the establishment of a civilian and security force (UNMIK) designed to stabilise the territory. The United States is a signatory of this Resolution.

In its preamble, Resolution 1244 states:

Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2,

In Annex I, it states that:

A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the KLA;

This interim political framework has been accomplished: Kosovo has had a functioning self-government for a number of years now. There is no reference in Resolution 1244 for the independence of Kosovo. This is rightly seen as a unilateral movement, and the diplomatic recognition of Kosovo by the United States can be seen as the territorial violation, absent the political recognition of an independent Kosovo by the Republic of Serbia, which is the legal successor to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Let’s look at the Helsinki Final Act, of which the United States is also a signatory. Articles II and III are particularly interesting:

III. Inviolability of frontiers
The participating States regard as inviolable all one another's frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in Europe and therefore they will refrain now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers.

Accordingly, they will also refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating State.


IV. Territorial Integrity of States
The participating States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the participating States. Accordingly, they will refrain from any action inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations against the territorial integrity, political independence or the unity of any participating State, and in particular from any such action constituting a threat or use of force.

The participating States will likewise refrain from making each other's territory the object of military occupation or other direct or indirect measures of force in contravention of international law, or the object of acquisition by means of such measures or the threat of them. No such occupation or acquisition will be recognized as legal.


Judging from both documents, the US is in clear violation of both the Helsinki Act and UN Resolution 1244.

There is no legal basis for diplomatically recognising an independent Kosovo, which according to law has the status of an autonomous province in the Republic of Serbia. By proceeding along this path, i.e. diplomatic recognition without the prior recognition and agreement of Serbia, the United States has lost its status as an impartial partner, and is contravening the very basis of international law it is now claiming for its own benefit.

So why is this a problem? Because it establishes a precedent, no matter how much Condoleeza Rice or Marti Ahtisaari claim otherwise. Marti Ahtisaari’s Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s Future Status states, among others:

15. Kosovo is a unique case that demands a unique solution. It does not create a precedent for other unresolved conflicts. In unanimously adopting resolution 1244 (1999), the Security Council responded to Milosevic’s actions in Kosovo by denying Serbia a role in its governance, placing Kosovo under temporary United Nations administration and envisaging a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future. The combination of these factors makes Kosovo’s circumstances extraordinary.

This is absurd. Any number of other “frozen conflict” administrations will now step up, seeking “independence”: The Republica Srpska part of Bosnia-Herzegovina; the region of Trans-Dniester; Ossetia and Abkhazia; the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (that part of Cyprus under military occupation by Turkey since 1974).

What the United States – and the United Nations – have done is open Pandora’s box, stating that any region which has an ethnic majority and has suffered civil violence has the right to declare independence. The United States may not really care about the examples above (where it has not vital interests), but it Kurdistan separates from Iraq, or the Kurdish regions of Turkey press for independence, it would no doubt be firmly against independence.

As a result of this issue, but also as a result of other UN initiatives, such as the Annan Plan for the resolution of the Turkish occupation of Cyprus, it is entirely unclear to me why the UN is so intent on violating the very principles enshrined in its Charter as well as Resolution 1244. UN efforts at conflict resolution are unfortunately becoming not worth the paper they are printed on.

The recognition of an independent Kosovo is a blunder of epic proportions. It raises the spectre of further brinkmanship over ethnic secession: there are any number of dormant or active ethnic conflicts in the Balkans. Over 30% of the population of FYR Macedonia is ethnic Albanian, and the spectre of a “Greater Albania” has just gained much more weight following the Kosovo secession. Turkey has intrigued about a “Turkish minority” in Greece for years, though the Treaty of Lausanne has clearly established that this is a Muslim minority. Kosovo’s independence establishes that armed conflict followed by UN intervention is a viable means of attaining ethnic secession.

As I have already stated, I am not against independence of Kosovo in principle. However, there are better, fairer ways of handling this, which do not contravene international law.

One such way would have been to transfer Kosovo’s trusteeship from the United Nations to the European Union, and promising supervised independence only once the Republic of Serbia entered the EU. This would have been a longer-term process which would have involved the equivalent adoption of European law, the Acquis communautaire, in the two regions. Under this scenario, both sides would have had to comply with the Acquis, following the standard EU accession process.

Another alternative would have been to continue the UN Trusteeship for a longer period of time – perhaps for 15 or 20 years – until a newer generation of leaders would have been able to resolve the situation. Contrary to the Ahtisaari Report, there is no pressing requirement for independence on the part of the international community, only on the part of certain elements in Kosovo.

We would be wise to avoid the oversimplification apparent in US foreign policy. Idealism is good, but to claim “independence and democracy” as a panacea for all raises vast political problems, and can never be applied uniformly. If this were official US policy, then we would have to recognise Hamas (not condemn it); condemn Hosni Mubarak (not supply him with weapons) and withdraw support from Pervez Musharraf.

The diplomatic recognition of Kosovo sets a dangerous precedent. It violates general international law as well as specific treaties entered into by the United States, and so obviously fans the flames of ethnic secession and political meddling in the Balkans and farther afield.

Monday, 11 February 2008

Kosovo and Ukraine

There are two issues which will likely hit the headlines this week, and it's worth a moment of reflection on both, since they both involve important political principles.

It's likely that Kosovo will declare independence this week, possibly around 17-18 February. Kosovar Prime Minister Hasim Thaci stated that this was a "done deal" last week at a press conference in Pristina.

Meanwhile, in Ukraine, the government of Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenka submitted a hotly-contested application to join NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP) in late January.

In the Kosovo case, the principle of self determination is enshrined in the UN Charter, which states that "all peoples have the right [to] freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." Together with the actions taken by the Milosevic government in the late 1990s, this has formed the basis for the UN's trusteeship of Kosovo.

The obverse side of the argument, of course, is that a declaration of independence violates the territorial integrity of Serbia, of which Kosovo remains formally a province. Under the UN Charter, "any action that would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and thus possessed of a Government representing the whole people belonging to the territory" is illegal.

Lawyers will be able to argue at length on whether the Milosevic government did extend equal rights and self-determination of people during its regime, and presumably Serbia's position against independence will be supported by Russia with a veto in the Security Council. How this situation will play out is unknown: in the first round of independence in the former Yugoslavia, we remember that Germany recognised Croatia immediately, and that the Yugoslav wars soon followed. While noone predicts an equivalent outcome today (Serbia has stated publically it is against the resolution of this conflict by force), the fact is that this will set a precedent, however much Condoleeza Rice may claim otherwise.

Rice Addresses Afghanistan, Kosovo, Middle East in Norway
26 April 2007
http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2007/April/20070426170149sjhtrop0.31448.html

Regarding a possible U.N. Security Council resolution issue, she said the United States wants “to work with Russia and, indeed, with the Serbs to make certain … that everybody understands that Kosovo is sui generis, that this is not a precedent for any other circumstances in which there might be a claim of independence,” but instead arises from “a very particular set of conditions” created by the Balkan war.

This is a bizarre interpretation of international law, but unfortunately on par with the Bush Administration's understanding of this topic. Obviously, Kosovo's independence will certainly serve as a precedent in future conflicts, just as America's invasion of Iraq is already serving as a precedent for Turkey's bombing of Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq. Legal precedents are often interpreted by those with power to decide matters in their own favour.

Which brings us to the issue of Ukraine's application to NATO's MAP. I have no opinion on this matter one way or the other, just as I have no opinion on the issue of Kosovo's independence. However, it seems to me that an application to join NATO serves political interests rather than national interests.

Ukraine is still very closely tied to Russia, economically and certainly ethnically. An application to join NATO is being interpreted by Russia as a hostile action, and predictably given Russia's history. In response, I would expect that Russia's most effective tools will be:

1. A revaluation of gas prices exported to Ukraine;
2. Raising the issue of bilateral debts between Ukraine and Russia, including debts for natural gas exports;
3. Re-visiting the issue of tariffs on Ukrainian exports to Russia, which will have an immediate adverse economic effect;
4. Ad-hoc political tensions, perhaps in the Kerch straights or the "trans-Dniestrian" border.
5. A renewal of the arrest warrant for Julia Timoshenka.

Given the close ties between Russia and Ukraine, it is difficult to see what the national interest of Ukraine is in this matter. Does the Ukrainian government believe that Ukraine is under military threat from Russia? Does it believe that even in the case of a Russian invasion, NATO would come to it's aid? NATO has done previous little to support its members in past incidents of political tension, and currently cannot even scrape enough troops together to take on the Taliban.

I see the dual issues of Kosovo and Ukraine linked in terms of their impact on Russia. The Kosovo case will constitute a further precedent (quite apart from the 2003 US invasion of Iraq invasion) for Russia to support its "national interest", however it chooses to define this. Ukraine's NATO application is another indication that Russia is being encircled by a hostile alliance. This follows the 1999 NATO expansion to include Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland and the 2002 expansion to include Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Anyone who believes that Russia will be "onside" in future issues over Iran's nuclear programme, the Georgian-Abkhazian issue, the provision of natural gas, or any other major world issue should think again.

And yet, in both the case of Kosovo's independence and Ukraine's application to join NATO, the issue can be distilled down to one of self-determination. An objective, international court of law would probably support Kosovo's declaration of independence. Ukraine is certainly within its national sovereign rights to apply to join NATO. The relative benefits for the rest of the international community are, unfortunately, unclear.