Second Memo on Snowden

Dear President Obama,

It looks like you didn’t receive my first memo on how to handle Edward Snowden. And what happened yesterday, when President Evo Morales’ plane was denied overflight through French,  Spanish and Portuguese airspace, only confirms the magnitude of the problem. 

Let’s start with what’s really going on. The United States has broken the law. Amendment I of the US Constitution reads:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

By granting government officials, sleazy contractors and the pimply youths they employ the technological access to retain and read every single one of my emails or texts, you are most certainly abridging my freedom of speech.

You have granted yourself these rights without any prior notification to me (or to anyone else), and without any possibility of redress for anyone living in the real world, who is neither going to appeal to the Supreme Court, nor run for elected office to try to “change” things.

The United States has also broken international law. Article 1 of the United Nations Charter adopted in San Francisco in 1945, reads:

To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;

By using surveillance technology to capture all “foreign” email and internet traffic passing through the United States, as well as by tapping into internet servers and telecommunications hubs in Germany, Belgium and a host of other countries, you are most certainly violating the principle of equal rights. Under current US law, the data on non-US citizens and US citizens living outside the United States is subject to a lower category of protection, and can be captured and stored without their consent, and without FISA approval.

Both in its legal underpinning (or semblance thereof) as well as in its actions, your administration’s surveillance efforts against European allies does nothing to develop friendly relations among nations. It does the opposite.

Thusfar, your administration’s response to the very real fury in Europe over these actions has been to mumble platitudes about the fight against terrorism and the arcane procedures used to safeguard privacy. Few people on the street believe them.  

And then the incident with President Evo Morales occurred. His jet was barred from the airspace of France, Spain and Portugal in rapid succession, as he was returning from a conference in Moscow. The ostensible reason was the suspicion that Edward Snowden was onboard. He was forced to sit for 12 hours in Vienna Airport while this situation was resolved. President Morales, quite rightly, is furious, and most of Latin America is furious with him.

Mr. President, you must surely understand how craven this looks. These actions are making an unwinnable and untenable situation worse. They are removing public support for the United States and the broader system of alliances and shared interests which lie at the heart of the Transatlantic Alliance.

Edward Snowden should be returned to the United States by transparent means. He should be granted his day in court. If he wishes to seek political asylum in another country, he should be allowed to do so, and an extradition request issued.

When all you have is a hammer, everything else looks like a nail. Put down the hammer, Mr. President. Address the very real revulsion felt by tens of millions of Americans and other citizens against the illegal and unwarranted seizure of personal information. Do not allow the search for solutions in the War on Terror to perpetuate it.

In what now seems like many years ago, a young Senator for Illinois who had just been elected President made a speech at Grant Field in Chicago, and said:

To those — to those who would tear the world down: We will defeat you. To those who seek peace and security: We support you. And to all those who have wondered if America's beacon still burns as bright: Tonight we proved once more that the true strength of our nation comes not from the might of our arms or the scale of our wealth, but from the enduring power of our ideals: democracy, liberty, opportunity and unyielding hope.

How different that sounded then.

Sincerely yours,

Philip

Giving away Iraq

The withdrawal of US forces from Iraq continues. The Washington Post ran an article today ("Millions worth of gear left in Iraq") on the effort to move or dispose US equipment during the withdrawal of forces: part of it is being donated to Iraqi forces. The cap is apparently $ 30 million per facility, with 280 facilities affected.

Besides the discussions over whether this equipment could be used in Afghanistan or some other theatre, it’s interesting to reflect that the $ 30 million presumably relates to depreciated US dollars. Assuming an air conditioning unit, for instance, has spend 3 years in-country (or 3 years from the date of sale to the US military), it’s already lost 60% of its value, assuming a 5-year depreciation term. So the $ 30 million in depreciated terms could be as high as $ 150 million in new purchases.

Assuming a mid-range of $ 75 million per facility for newly-purchased equipment, and multiplying by 280 facilities, then the US taxpayer is looking at a give-away of $ 21 billion. It probably won’t be that high: let’s assume it’s only half this estimate. That’s still $ 10.5 billion.

And, in one of the final, humiliating codas of the US invasion and occupation of Iraq, as soon as US soldiers leave, the facilities are looted. The Post article writes:

Some U.S. military officials worry that much of the equipment left behind could be looted. A U.S. officer whose unit turned over a Joint Security Station in Baghdad to the Iraqi army this summer said Iraqi soldiers looted the facility within hours of their official departure.

"When we returned to the outpost the next morning, most of the beds had already been taken, wood walls and framing had been pulled and several air-conditioning units had been removed from the walls, leaving gaping holes," said the officer, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the event reflects negatively on the Iraqis.

Weeks later, the Caterpillar generator the Americans left behind was barely working, the officer said.

It’s interesting to note that in the United States, over 65% of all US federal government revenue derives from personal income taxes. Which means that this give-away is financed by—who else?--the US taxpayer. A frightful waste of money. Except, of course, for the lobbyists, contractors and perhaps even government officials who all earned their commissions from the process.

As with the phantom weapons of mass destruction, here goes the phantom reconstruction of Iraq. I wonder what will happen in Afghanistan when the US withdraws?

The Afghanistan Surge

On December 1st, President Barack Obama took the long-anticipated step of sending an additional 30,000 US combat troops to Afghanistan. This will raise the total US troop commitment to between 100,000 – 105,000 troops, taking into account the 71,000 already in the country. NATO and other allies have an estimated additional 42,000 troops in Afghanistan.

I was struck by the negative reaction by Michael Moore and other liberals. Obama’s actions are somehow seen as a betrayal of core ideals, as war-mongering. Many commentators stated that Obama’s speech could have been delivered by George W. Bush. Take a look at the opening paragraph of Michael Moore’s November 30th letter to Barack Obama:

If you go to West Point tomorrow night (Tuesday, 8pm) and announce that you are increasing, rather than withdrawing, the troops in Afghanistan, you are the new war president. Pure and simple. And with that you will do the worst possible thing you could do -- destroy the hopes and dreams so many millions have placed in you.

Yet a surge of troops in Afghanistan has been a core platform of Obama’s election campaign. The plan to draw down troops from Iraq and re-deploy combat brigades to Afghanistan has been one of his earliest campaign pledges, as his website still shows:

Barack Obama will refocus our efforts on Afghanistan. He has a comprehensive strategy to succeed in Afghanistan with at least two more U.S. combat brigades, more resources and training for the Afghan Army, and a comprehensive development strategy.

What strikes me most of all is that the American public has perhaps finally realised that the war in Afghanistan is increasingly difficult to justify. On the one hand, the elected “government” of the country has lapsed into unbridled corruption and in many cases collusion with the Taleban. On the other hand, the situation in Pakistan is dire, all denials by that country’s government notwithstanding. All these facts have long been known to anyone with even the most cursory interest in the matter.

The costs of a combat deployment of 100,000 US troops in Afghanistan are likely to exceed $ 100 billion per year, using the rule of thumb that each 1,000 troops cost about $ 1 billion. This does not include the costs of replacing or repairing damaged equipment, treating long-term casualties, etc. Taking all associated costs into account, I doubt that this engagement will be any “cheaper” than Iraq, as some commentators have said in recent months.

Another interesting point: the lessons of the Iraq surge have been incorporated into the current plan for Afghanistan. There are resources for development, although these are a small proportion of the amount spent on military operations. There are sufficient analyses and policy statement on the causes of terrorism and extremism, methods of countering them, and ways forward, dating all the way back to the original Afghanistan Compact of 2001.

What remains to be seen is whether the West has the political will and the financial resources to actually implement these lessons. I sincerely doubt that it does, and I do not say this as a means of criticism, but of simple, rational evaluation of costs and benefits.

At one point, the alliance that is fighting in Afghanistan will have to decide whether it can afford to sacrifice men, blood and treasure to this conflict, for which it has no real strategic reason to be in which could not be better addressed by other means.

My feeling is that this point occurred in 2005-2006 for the majority of countries involved. It is only the self-interest of individual politicians that has sustained the level of troop commitment until now.

My predictions for the next two years: the surge will partially succeed, but 18 months will not be enough to create the conditions for lasting peace and prosperity needed to provide stability to Afghanistan. In contrast, the Taleban and Al Qaeda will play a waiting game in this time until political costs force the inevitable retreat of western troops.

In these 18 months, we will see higher casualties from IEDs and other indirect attacks than by open combat between western and Taleban units, and we will see that even 30,000 additional troops will not be able to “clear and hold” the ground in the south east of Afghanistan. The 1,500 mile border with Pakistan will continue to be porous. Despite active combat operations, I expect US fatalities to remain [relatively] low in this period, perhaps on the order of 150-200 troops.

Conditions in Pakistan and Afghanistan will deteriorate in terms of governance and political involvement. In Afghanistan, I doubt President Karzai will make any meaningful reform of the public sector or the involvement of warlords in governing the country. He will probably use every opportunity to criticize the west to detract attention from the real problems of the country. He will become increasingly despised and denigrated in the western media.

In Pakistan, I would not at all be surprised to see a new military dictatorship within the next 24 months, either in open or concealed form, and a new arrangement reached with Taleban groups to halt open warfare between the Pakistani Army and the Taleban. It is regrettable that neither Presidents Karzai or Zardari appear to be able to unify their own countries, at least in terms acceptable to western public opinion. But there are no easy answers to this issue.

The ultimate question is: “Is it worth it?” The easy answer is “no.” Bringing peace and stability to this area will take at least 25 years and civilian spending of at least $ 25-30 billion per year in excess of military spending. I don’t see any signs that anyone in the West is prepared for such a commitment, and indeed, most countries are considering their exit options. The US surge itself has a built-in expiration date.

However, you also have to ask what other options exist. Are we really prepared to exit Afghanistan and usher in a new dark age as the country sinks back into the pre-Taleban, Somali-like condition it was in before the Taleban consolidated control? What happens to Pakistan, and its 100-odd nuclear warheads? What happens to neighbouring countries such as Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan, which will be the next dominos to fall?

Difficult questions to answer. No such discussion can make up for even one life lost. On the other hand, very few such discussions highlight the good taking place on the ground in Afghanistan by international development efforts, or outline what should be done to expand these efforts so that within a generation, they can provide a lasting effect.

We seem once again condemned to launch grand initiatives destined to end in failure. Is the right course to try in the face of overwhelming odds, spending hundreds of billions of dollars and “sacrificing” hundreds of lives? Or to withdraw in the face of overwhelming odds, thus spending tens of billions of dollars and condemning thousands of lives to death and repression?

Snatching Defeat from the Jaws of Victory

The New York Times published an internal memo by Colonel Timothy Reese yesterday. Colonel Reese is Chief of the Baghdad Operations Command Advisory Team, and as such has been heavily involved in the training and development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).

His memorandum—never designed to be leaked to the general public—is remarkable for its unvarnished and objective look at the security situation in Iraq. Some of the remarkable statements in the memo:

• Prime Minister (PM) Maliki hailed June 30th as a “great victory,” implying the victory was over the US.

• Remaining in Iraq through the end of December 2011 will yield little in the way of improving the abilities of the ISF or the functioning of the GOI. Furthermore, in light of the GOI’s current interpretation of the limitations imposed by the 30 June milestones of the 2008 Security Agreement, the security of US forces are at risk.

• The ineffectiveness and corruption of GOI Ministries is the stuff of legend.

• The military culture of the Baathist-Soviet model under Saddam Hussein remains entrenched and will not change. The senior leadership of the ISF is incapable of change in the current environment.

a) Corruption among officers is widespread
b) Neglect and mistreatment of enlisted men is the norm
c) The unwillingness to accept a role for the NCO corps continues
d) Cronyism and nepotism are rampant in the assignment and promotion system
e) Laziness is endemic
f) Extreme centralization of C2 is the norm
g) Lack of initiative is legion
h) Unwillingness to change, do anything new blocks progress
i) Near total ineffectiveness of the Iraq Army and National Police institutional organizations and systems prevents the ISF from becoming self-sustaining
j) For every positive story about a good ISF junior officer with initiative, or an ISF commander who conducts a rehearsal or an after action review or some individual MOS training event, there are ten examples of the most basic lack of military understanding despite the massive partnership efforts by our combat forces and advisory efforts by MiTT and NPTT teams.

There is little reason to doubt this assessment: It corresponds to every other objective assessment of the situation that has been coming out of Iraq.

It’s a good time, therefore, to reflect on what has occurred:

• Iraq was invaded in 2003 under a falsified claim of possessing weapons of mass destruction and links to Al Qaeda by the Bush Administration. Every one of the pre-war claims have been proven false, in many cases even before the date of the invasion. Yet the story of aluminium tubes, Prague meetings or Niger yellowcake have been forgotten. George Bush builds his library and gives the occasional speech; Tony Blair’s name has obscenely been put forward as the next President of the European Council.

• The occupation of Iraq was blatantly misplanned, leading to thousands of American and Allied deaths, and hundreds of thousands of Iraqi deaths. Paul Bremmer was awarded the Medal of Freedom; Donald Rumsfeld has retired into obscurity, for which we are grateful.

• At this time, Iraq, is essentially divided into three statelets: The Shia-controlled centre, east and south; the Sunni-controlled west; and the Kurdish-controlled north.

• Iranian influence over the Shia statelet continues to grow. Reports of Iranian control over militias and government ministries alike has been corroborated from several sources.

• The Sunni détente that was achieved by creating the “Sons of Iraq” is in the process of unravelling, as the Shia-dominated government reneges on promises made and begins to slowly disarm and disenfranchise the Sunni militias, and withhold their pay.

• The US promise to withdraw from combat operations and urban areas has fundamentally weakened the deterent threat of US power. This in turns makes any pretense of political reconciliation impossible.

• Whatever benefits won by the “surge” have been effectively lost by the Obama Administration’s decision—which was fully consistent with pledges made by the Bush Administration—to withdraw from Iraq.

If we accept these conclusions, which I believe are objective and evidence for all to see, then the incoherence and failure of American policy is simply breath-taking:

• Iraq was invaded on patently false pretences;

• The occupation was mismanaged, at tremendous cost in blood and treasure;

• Once a new strategy—the “surge” was finally put into effect and worked—both the Bush and Obama administrations literally pulled the rug out from other the feet of the US military by ordering a phased withdrawal.

America is withdrawing, leaving a broken state, where external political interference from Iran, Syria and other anti-US powers is increasing. We leave behind us another foul dictatorship and the prospect of years of low-level warfare that will inevitably draw us into renewed conflict.

In fact, there has been one clear winner in Iraq. Iran has managed to tie down US forces and broken American political will for an attack on its nuclear facilities. It has consolidated control over its ancient enemy-Iraq, and particularly over Basra and the oil-rich east of the country. It has learned how to combat American ground and air forces, and has extended its sphere of influence in the Middle East.

There are also a number of collateral winners: China has been able to continue its military and economic build-up unimpeded. Together with Russia, it emerges strengthened as America weakens. Although Russia will never recover its greatness, it’s clear that it’s room for manoeuvre has increased as it consolidates control over economic assets and neighbouring countries.

In the meantime, American combat fatalities number over 4,000, while permanently disabled and injured veterans number over 25,000. The cost so far in direct military expenditure as well as the cost of replacing worn-down equipment is probably at the $ 1 trillion mark. Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes estimate that the true cost of the war is over $ 3 trillion.

The American public appears to have forgotten about Iraq. Lulled by the Obama Administration’s promise to withdraw, the war no longer dominates the headlines. The geostrategic implications of America’s defeat—for defeat is what we are talking about—are rarely to be seen in public fora. Instead, the American public sinks deeper into its hedonistic morass of the next big sensation, the next You Tube hit, and the next irrelevant public debate.

As the summer of 2009 draws to a close, we are confronted with a debilitating strategic failure in Iraq. This failure leaves the United States less secure economically and politically that it was in 2003, and has created new opportunities for strategic enemies.

Absent a radical and fundamental re-think of US foreign, military and economic policy, we appear doomed to repeat the mistakes of the past. As our national debt skyrockets and political incoherence grips Washington, you can sense the headlines of American decline being written.

Instead of thinking, and preparing for the future, we are being drawn into another pointless conflict—that of Iraq and Pakistan—which military arms alone cannot hope to win, in which we are unaware of the true cost that will be incurred, and in which we appear to refuse to deploy the socio-economic tools are necessary for victory.

I write this post with sadness. I was opposed to the Iraq war from the start, and predicted the failure of the US occupation. Yet its failure has been beyond my grimmest forecasts. The human cost has been tremendous: the sacrifices of American troops and their families perhaps not meaningless, but certainly in vain. The economic cost is still being counted. The strategic consequences are emerging, but as yet unknown.

Napoleon Bonaparte said that “In politics, stupidity is not a handicap.” I regret that it’s never the politicians who pay for their stupidity.

Responses to 9/11

Richard Clarke deserves thanks for speaking out to correct the historical and moral perspective of the aftermath of 9/11 in his Op Ed today in the Washington Post The Trauma of 9/11 Is No Excuse. His candour and reminder that some principles are meant to be enduring are of critical value in an age where the political spin and historical amnesia dominate.

The true costs of the US response to 9/11 have yet to be calculated. Today, we are neither losing nor winning two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, at tremendous human and financial cost. Our surrogates are corrupt governments who hardly personify the lofty ideals we claim, and who in many cases are working against us. The withdrawal of US military forces from either country would probably result in a rapid collapse and disintegration of either national government, and the resumption of insurgency operations in urban and rural areas.

With this example, and with the examples of so many other US interventions, and with the inability (or unwillingness) of US policy to focus on the root causes of extremism rather than the symptoms, I see nothing on the horizon to convince me that the US engagements in Iraq or Afghanistan or the Long War against terrorism will be a success.

It is remarkable how soon public attention has abandoned the soaring rhetoric and unreality of the Bush Administration’s justifications for invading Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet while we have forgotten, others live amid the consequences of our actions. Hence, so must we.

Today, we are engaged in a vast policy of managing domestic political aspirations amidst the ruin we have created abroad. While we may believe that we can expunge the historical record after every 4-year election cycle, our Taleban and Al Quaeda opponents have a very different opinion. This is reality.

The idea that we can withdraw from Iraq, reinforce Afghanistan and “win” both conflicts is a political fantasy. Iraq has all but disintegrated as a single political entity, while its national government remains dominated by foreign and sectarian interests. The Shia government’s campaign against the Sunni “Sons of Iraq” will end in renewed bloodshed. Iranian influence has long consolidated over certain sections of Iraq, and will be there long after we leave. There will be no victory in Iraq, merely the management of diminishing expectations, defined by how few casualties and fatalities we measure per month.

The “Afpak” counter-insurgency will require at least a generation of massive military and technical assistance designed to take enduring majorities of citizens in both countries from the metaphorical dark ages into the contemporary middle class. Success will be defined by the extent to which corruption can be minimised, government services and education improved, minority and gender rights guaranteed, and religious extremism moderated. It will also require the lasting reform of the Pakistani intelligence services and military, which in itself will require a lasting peace between India and Pakistan and the resolution of the status of Kashmir.

Public debate on these goals is non-existent. We hear that we have to “save Pakistan” (who wants nuclear weapons in the hand of Al Quaeda, after all), but we hear nothing of the magnitude or cost of this goal.

As with so many other American engagements, I can foresee a point somewhere in the future when the goalposts are shifted, victory is declared, and the troops are withdrawn with a minimum of fanfare. It is, after all, the same strategy that has been followed in so many past engagements.

In the meantime, we will have further indebted our country and taken hundreds or thousands of casualties for a political objective in which we have no real vital interest, or which could have been handled more effectively through alternative means.

It’s hardly “change we can believe in.” It’s more like “business as usual.”