Wednesday, 16 November 2011

Antony Samaras’ Scarlet Letter


One of the advantages of an American high school education is learning English literature from teachers who are usually highly dedicated to their profession*. One such work of literature is Nathaniel Hawthorne’s Scarlet Letter, which takes place in a Puritan village near Boston in 1642, and deals with the travails and eventual transformation of Hester Prynne, a woman condemned for adultery who is forced to wear the letter “A” on her clothing. Although this “A” initially stands for “adultery”, Hester’s persistence in the face of ostracism and suffering, and her turn towards charitable work, mean that by the time of her old age and death, the “A” is transformed into something else entirely. Some interpretations leads us to believe it is “Able”; I always preferred the interpretation of “Angel”.

The contradictions of personal liberty and public ideals expressed in the Scarlet Letter were brought to my mind by the latest antics of Mr. Antony Samaras, the leader of New Democracy. Followers of Greece’s public events will know that Mr. Samaras finds himself in a highly contradictory position:

·     He has pledged to support the new government, led by Dr. Lucas Papademos, but has announced he will not support any new taxes or austerity measures;

·       He has refined this position, stating that he will support government cutbacks, but not new taxes or any measures which constrain growth. In other words, he supports the October 26th agreement, but not its measures (or conditionality);

·     He has recently said that the only reason he agreed to support the government was for Greece to receive the sixth instalment of the first bail-out agreement.

This contradiction has not gone unnoticed by the European Union or the Greek population. The European Commission has asked that the main political parties supporting the government, the Governor of the Central Bank, and the Prime Minister sign an official letter supporting the October 26th agreement. Mr. Samaras has refused to sign such a letter, saying that “his word of honour” was enough.

I’m particularly intrigued by the “pro-growth” position that while cutting back government expenditure is acceptable, further taxes are not. This reveals a deep misunderstanding of the nature of gross domestic product (GDP) and how it is measured.

GDP is a simple measure of the value of all goods and services produced within a country in one calendar year. GDP can be measured using three standard methodologies, which I summarise in non-economic terms here:

a. The Production (Output) Approach
This method measures (or estimates) the gross value of domestic output of all registered enterprises, individuals and public organisations in the country. The accepted method for doing so is Gross Value Added = [Output Value] – [Intermediate Consumption Value].

b. The Income Approach
This method measures the income declared by all economic actors in the country which declare one. Income includes salaries and wages, pensions, corporate profits, financial and investment interest income, and taxes. The accepted method is GDP = [Employee Compensation] + [Operating Income] + [Gross Mixed Income] + [Taxes] – [Subsidies].

c. The Expenditure Approach
This method measures all declared financial expenditure in a country, including personal and corproate income and investment, government spending, and net exports. The accepted method is GDP = [Consumption] + [Investment] + [Government Spending] + [Net Exports].

Anyone familiar with the Greek economy can therefore understand why it is difficult to measure GDP in Greece. If you visit a dentist and don’t receive a receipt, the value of this transaction doesn’t appear in GDP. If your uncle in the village gives you 5 litres of olive oil from your family’ trees, this doesn’t appear in GDP, even through it is an economic activity.

But the point of this post isn’t to expound on the morality of GDP, but on what government expenditure means in measuring GDP. In each of the three definitions, it’s established that government expenditure counts in measuring GDP.

Thus, if the government reduces its salaries in the public sector, or eliminates public sector jobs, its expenditure will theoretically fall: that’s the point of the cutbacks. Alternatively, if we measure using the income approach, public sector wages will fall. Therefore, so will GDP.

So in economic terms, it is a logical fallacy to claim that someone can be in favour of government cutbacks, but against further taxes, because the former is “good” and the latter is “pro growth.” It depends on what kind of growth one is referring to, its relative magnitude, and how quickly the transfer of economic activity between one sector and the other sector occurs.

But even if we look at private sector growth, the contradictions are all too apparent. When you cut government expenditure on payroll, this has a direct impact on consumer spending by former or current government employees. Since most consumer spending is on items such as groceries or services which are provided by the private sector, it is logical to assume that private sector expenditure will also fall.

The result? Lower public sector staff expenditure = lower private sector income = lower private sector growth = lower GDP growth.

Over the longer term, and in an economy which is well-regulated and tax evasion is minimal, we could indeed hope that certain public sector activities will be eliminated or replaced by more productive activities, and that private sector activity would replace them and lead to higher productivity and innovation. Yet this is far from assured in the Greek context given the operations of the private sector, and it is also almost certainly impossible in a recession of the kind Greece finds itself.

So I have to wonder if Mr. Samaras realises that he is not only contradicting himself in political terms, but in economic terms. Yet it is precisely this economic competence that he trumpets at every opportunity as the basis for his readiness to lead Greece.  

Watching this eminently dishonourable process, I have to ask myself just which letter I would assign to Mr. Samaras at the present time, and how future generations will interpret it.


© Philip Ammerman, 2011 


* I had three phenomenal English teachers at the American Community Schools of Athens: Steven Medeiros, Marca Daley and Maria Priles. Steve and Marca are still at ACS, educating generations of students in the best way possible. Maria, whose value as an English teacher I only realised years afterwards, regretfully passed on some years ago.

Monday, 14 November 2011

The First Papademos Speech to Parliament




I’ve just tuned in to Dr. Loucas Papademos’s first speech to the Greek Parliament, outlining his economic programme.

It’s interesting that he suggests that consequences of austerity include unemployment, business closure and social unrest. This is true, and was probably specifically included in the speech as a sop to New Democracy. Yet his recommendations for this are unimaginative and anodyne: 

a.     More and faster structural reform to guarantee competitiveness
b.     Rapid absorption of ESPA funds
c.     Rapid investment in renewable energy

None of these “solutions” is really a solution for the large majority of workers, pensioners or company managers:

Faster Structural Reform
In order for this to work, the structural reform has to be implemented in practise. This will lead to higher unemployment and reduced spending among the public sector workforce, and much of the private sector workforce, if this actually occurs. Any “inheritor” of state-owned enterprises will then have to further restructure to work out debt, install new IT systems, retrain, etc. It will be at least 2-3 years before the average worker will see any results from this.

Rapid Absorption of ESPA (European Union) Funds
Although this could in theory help, the reality is that the funding is quite low compared to the challenges facing the country. Furthermore, the funding will be channelled into large infrastructure projects or other projects which do not materially affect the average worker or household, but do affect a handful of specialised enterprises. There was also no mention of reducing corruption or political favouritism in the absorption of these funds.

Rapid Investment in Renewable Energy
This is false economic logic. Renewable energy costs more per kw-h than the energy currently produced by Greece’s energy mix. This means that the energy consumer—the household—will soon be burdened with a higher energy cost, including higher VAT and taxes on this. And there is, of course, no consumer choice: the consumer must consume this energy: there is no alternative, given the Public Power Corporations status as a public monopoly, and given national policy in this area. Furthermore, Greece must import nearly all capital investment for energy generation: solar panels produced in Germany or China; wind turbines produced in France or Denmark.

What was notable by its absence was any kind of bold initiative which could change market sentiment:

a.     A plan to privatise Hellenikon;
b.     A plan to delineate oil and gas exploration zones in Greece’s legal territory;
c.     A plan to license mineral exploration and development in Greece (including investments cancelled or delayed by PASOK)
d.     A plan for tourism and shipping in Greece.

Instead, it was the same old, discredited solutions we have been hearing for years now. If Greece had a million Euros every time a Greek politician said they would accelerate absorption of EU funds, these funds would have been absorbed by now.

It was interesting that he called for broadening the tax base and cracking down on tax evasion as a form of social justice. This was followed by a discourse on why Greece must stay in the Eurozone. He calls for all public servants, including people working in tax authorities, to implement their duties diligently.

My impression is that he is being told very carefully what to do or say by his cross-party minders, and that as a result not much is going to change, certainly nothing near what the situation requires.

Some related news from Greece:

ND leader Antonis Samaras announces that he won’t provide any written guarantees that he will support the new government, despite European requests to do so. In parallel, he states that he will not support any new austerity measures.

ND MP Sotires Hadjigakis has been expelled from the ND Party, ostensibly due to his comments regarding the presence of far-right elements in the party. It remains to be seen whether Mr. Samaras will be able to hold his party together in the face of what can only be described as very contradictory statements and policies. Something tells me he will not be able to, and that the temporary gains he enjoys in the opinion polls will be illusory.

On the other side of the aisle, George Papandreou has apparently refused to step down as leader of PASOK, and will probably have to be removed by popular vote in a party conference. Perhaps his referendum will occur after all.

And finally, everyone is gearing up for another violent set of protests this Thursday, in honour of November 17th.

To summarise: despite all impressions to the contrary, not much has changed. The situation has worsened. It remains to be seen what will actually be done by February 19th.

© Philip Ammerman, 2011

Thursday, 10 November 2011

Four Suggestions for Prime Minister Loucas Papademos

After four days of conflicting media reports and clumsy attempts by the ruling party to safeguard its interests, Dr. Loucas Papademos has been officially given the mandate to form a government by Greece’s President, Karolos Papoulias.

The challenges facing the new government are significant; its political support is limited. With this post, I would like to outline four suggestions which could help the country emerge from this crisis in the next year.

1.   The Formation of the Cabinet

It is of paramount importance that a cabinet is structured properly and then staff properly. Some key points to consider are the following:

a.     The complexity of the Greek public sector requires two independent ministries which reflect the main components of Greek GDP: Tourism and Shipping. At present, tourism is considered a secondary ministry, without a real budget, while shipping has been subsumed into Development. It is important that these two posts be made independent, resourced properly, and staffed by professionals from the sector.

b.     The functions of energy and environment must be split. Within the new Energy Ministry, priority must be given to starting exploration and development of oil and gas south of Crete, in the Ionian Sea, and elsewhere. Within the Environment Ministry, priority must be given to the active management of wildlife areas and natural parks, as well as enforcement of zoning laws and building codes.

c.     A new Ministry of Investment and Privatisation is required. The Invest in Greece agency should be brought into this structure, as should the Public Asset Management Agency. A specific privatisation plan is needed.

2.   A Plan for Growth

In order for Greece to meet its targets, a growth plan is urgently needed. Navigator Consulting Group has already drafted such a plan in May 2011, and is based on the following points:

a.     Creation of an offshore shipping centre to transfer ship registrations to Greece with a target of increasing from 2,046 in 2010 to 3,000 by 2015 and 4,000 by 2020.

b.     Promotion of investment in oil and gas as well as building materials. This should include the definition of at least 50 exploration blocks south of Crete, between Crete and Rhodes and in the Ionian, and licensing of at least 25 exploration campaigns in 2012.

c.     Energy sector investment promotion to replace lignite-burning units with natural gas generation with at least 8 large-scale units, as well as investments to create at least 10 integrated waste management centres in Greece.

d.     Increase in tourism arrivals from 16 million in 2011 to 25 million in 2020.

e.     Licensing at least 10 integrated resorts, 100 special-interest products, long-term PPP partnerships for ports and airports, and other projects designed to improve the tourism product in Greece.

f.      Creation of a pre-approved real estate “bank” and promotion of foreign investment in at least 20,000 vacation houses per year.

g.     Licensing of large-scale modern agricultural investments in advanced technology.

By our estimates, the total investment value of this plan is EUR 80 billion, creating at least EUR 7.5 billion in initial tax revenue during the investment period, and yielding at least EUR 11 billion in annual tax revenue once peak operating capacity has been reached. These do not include revenue from hydrocarbons, which would be much greater. We also believe that these objectives are conservative and achievable.

3.   A Plan for Social Survival

Greece is entering a depression. Unemployment will almost certainly reach 20% by the end of 2011; homelessness and hunger are increasing. It is imperative that the government activate emergency planning and access resources to provide hope in these desperate times. The basic dimensions of such a plan include:

·       The provision of vouchers for school lunches or equivalent support for 300,000 needy students

·       The provision of emergency food support for at least 300,000 families, enabling basic nutritional support to be met

·       The partial subsidy of at least 250,000 places of strictly temporary employment, either in the public or private sectors, preferably to be managed by non-governmental organisations or bodies

·       The end of the tax increase on household heating oil. 

Social Programme
# Units
Cost/Unit
# Days/Mo
Total Cost
School Lunch Programme
300,000
5
365
547,500,000
Emergency Food Support
300,000
8
365
876,000,000
Employment Support
250,000
400
12
1,200,000,000
Total
2,623,500,000

The costs of such a plan are high, at EUR 2.62 billion. I propose that these be paid for as follows:

·       Increase tax rates on cigarettes, alcohol, and carbonated soft drinks
·       Drawing down unused resources from the European Social Fund, EQUAL and related funds from the 2007-2013 Community Support Framework
·       A solidarity tax of 1% on all stock market transactions
·       Re-allocation of some privatisation revenue, i.e. on games of chance

4.   Tax Audits, Financial Amnesty and International Audits

The government must get serious about gaining a clear picture of untaxed income. It is impossible that the burden of revenue raises is borne primarily by salaries employees, whose share of direct income tax is usually 5 times that paid by companies. It is also necessary to audit independent professionals and offshore accounts more closely. The following are recommended:

a.     Automatic financial audits implemented on each taxpayer using a comparison of six key indicators per individual:

·       Bank account total income cash
·       Total bank loans and monthly instalments
·       Income tax statement: annual revenue
·       Total value of annual credit card purchases
·       Area (square meters) of home ownership
·       Type & model of car owned

These six factors generate a composite and accurate picture of true versus stated income. It should be implemented at once, taking into account a permanent lifting of bank secrecy.

b.     International deposit investigations and tax collection. These are underway in Switzerland. Greece also needs to form bilateral accords with Luxembourg, Lichtenstein, the United Kingdom and Cyprus for tax collection on bank deposits.

c.     Ending nominee shareholding for Greek citizens holding companies in Cyprus. The government of Cyprus should be required to turn over all income declared by Greek-held offshore companies to check if this income has been declared in Greece or not.

d.     A financial amnesty for undeclared funds repatriated by Greeks from international financial centres should be developed. 

While technically challenging, none of the four clusters of recommendations made here are impossible to implement; most of them are relatively easy. It remains to be seen if this government can finally emerge from its reactive mode and begin the process of strategic planning and implementation of activities needed for Greece’s economic and social survival.

© Philip Ammerman, 2011

Tuesday, 8 November 2011

Loucas Papademos to be nominated as the next Greek Prime Minister


Greek media have broken the story that the new Greek Prime Minister will be Dr. Loucas Papademos.

Dr. Papademos is the former Governor of the Bank of Greece and the former Vice President of the European Central Bank. He is a career economist, currently teaching at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. He has also been an advisor to Mr. Papandreou in 2010, although it is not certain what this actually entailed.

Dr. Papademos is a member of the Panhellenic Socialist Party (PASOK), and was involved in Greece’s effort to join the European Economic and Monetary Union in 2000. In this respect, there is considerable controversy over whether Greek statistical standards at the time were accurate or not, and whether the recognition of military and defence expenditure should be incurred at the point of order or delivery of weapons systems. The Bank of Greece, however, was not involved in the preparation of statistical data, and to its credit usually presents a balanced picture of the economy.

His appointment is ostensibly the result of a joint agreement between PASOK and New Democracy. In this respect, it will be necessary to view two key elements in the near future in order to understand the real level of political support he will receive:

a.     The number of votes he receives in the Parliamentary vote which will be needed to confirm him and his cabinet. We understand that Evangelos Venizelos (PASOK) remains as Minister of Finance and Deputy Prime Minister. This appointment will likely be balanced by a second Deputy Prime Minister from New Democracy.

b.     The number of votes in Parliament he will receive for the 2012 budget. This will be decisive.

It is reassuring to note that one reason the negotiations took so long was because Dr. Papademos demanded real political authority. In other words, he was not interested in being a mere caretaker. It is also reassuring that he has so much experience abroad. However, the real political power remains with the two main political parties, PASOK and ND, with the swing vote of LAOS and the centrist independents.

His formal appointment is expected this evening or tomorrow.

© Philip Ammerman, 2011
www.navigator-consulting.com