Showing posts with label Greek Privatisation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Greek Privatisation. Show all posts

Saturday, 23 May 2015

Latest Riga Summit Conclusions

Bloomberg, the FT and other sources are reporting that the latest Riga summit has concluded that the IMF is a full part of the Troika, and that the IMF's approval on structural reforms is necessary. The IMF, in turn, is reported as being opposed to a "quick and dirty review", as well as being opposed to rollbacks of earlier structural reforms made by SYRIZA.

Some indicative quotes seen this morning in the press:

Financial Times (Eurozone says no Greek deal without IMF / 22 May 2015)

IMF staff have told their board they would not disburse aid without a “comprehensive” deal that started to lower debt levels. They also want EU assurances that Greece will be able to pay its bills for the next 12 months, a demand that could require eurozone governments to commit to another bailout programme.

"It has to be a comprehensive approach, not a quick and dirty job," Christine Lagarde, IMF chief, said at an event in Rio de Janeiro on Friday.

Greek officials have told their eurozone counterparts they are worried about the IMF’s hardline stance and have argued their conditions are politically undeliverable, especially when it comes to the pension reforms, which remain the biggest stumbling block.

The IMF has clashed with the European Commission over how tough a line to take, with the commission going so far as to moot cutting the IMF out of a deal. But German officials have bristled at the commission’s interventions and have made clear all three bailout monitors — the IMF, the commission and the European Central Bank — must approve any deal.

Bloomberg (Merkel, Hollande Tell Greece to Take Route A to Agreement / 22 May 2015):

A government official, in a debriefing after the talks broke up about 1 a.m., signaled Greek frustration by saying that a main obstacle is that the International Monetary Fund needs to be on board. “Open issues” remain with creditors, including pensions, sales-tax rates and targets for a primary budget surplus, the official told reporters.


A short statement released separately by the French and German governments after more than two hours of talks with Tsipras was devoid of earlier optimism expressed by Hollande at paving the way for an accord as soon as the end of the month. In its place, the governments of the two biggest euro-area economies talked of agreement “to stay in close contact.”

While the IMF is in principle correct in questioning whether Greece is committed to reforms, and whether it will be able to sustain funding targets in 2015, some of the IMF's insistence on reforms is misplaced.

I refer, for instance, to the Fund's insistence that collective bargaining restrictions be lifted in Greece. Greek law already allows for sufficient latitude to dismiss workers: I have seen this first hand during involvement in a Greek privatisation in 2013.

Moreover, it is difficult for anyone involved with the "real" Greek economy to understand why this is even a priority right now. There is not a single investor I know for whom collective bargaining is a serious issue regarding operations in Greece right now. On the contrary: there are far more important  challenges to investing or restructuring in Greece.

The main challenge is gaining government licensing for new investments or renovations of existing investments. We have seen on any number of occasions that gaining approval to build or even renovate a hotel, for instance, is beset with useless approval seeking from over 15 main authorities (with multiple steps typically necessary within each authority).

The second challenge is gaining respite from the huge bureaucracy (approvals-process) of normal operations in Greece. For instance, the approvals necessary to operate a restaurant, or to export a container of food, are insane, and useless for any real purpose of consumer protection.

The third challenge is the corruption that is engendered by the first and second challenges. The more approvals necessary, the higher the payoff necessary to operate.

I also don't see the IMF making any practical suggestions about reforming the justice system. Speaking frankly, the reason corruption and bad business practises survive in Greece is because getting a court decision can take years to resolve, and then the decisions are often never implemented by civil authorities. The IMF's focus on "improving the business environment" are interesting, but without focussing on the reality, these are mainly ivory-tower theory.

This is only one of many reforms which may look good on paper, but are not important in practise. Once again, a lack of prioritisation prevails.

Without knowing what SYRIZA will do, I'm beginning to wonder if this isn't the straw that breaks the SYRIZA back. If I myself am not convinced by certain IMF reform priorities, how will SYRIZA convince its own voters?



(c) Philip Ammerman, 2015


Related Posts

The Great Taxi Non-Liberalisation
1 April 2012

Wednesday, 21 January 2015

Are Greece’s creditors really loan sharks?



I’ve lost count of the number of times I’ve heard Greece’s creditors referred to by local media and politicians as usurers or loan sharks (τοκογλύφους). According to Meriam Webster, a usurer is defined as a person who lends money and requires the borrower to pay a high amount of interest

The idea that Greece’s debt burden is too high is at the centrepiece of SYRIZA’s political promises (to implement a haircut of 50% of the total debt; to restructure the rest and link it to GDP growth).

But what does it mean for debt to be unmanageable? And who is responsible? There are no fixed definitions here, but let’s look at a few interesting points.

Greek Debt and Interest Rates

The current Greek debt level is listed by the Public Debt Management Agency at € 321.7 billion as of 30 September 2014. According to the provisional 2014 Budget Execution Bulletin by the Greek Ministry of Finance, Greece’s 2014 central government expenditure was € 54.967 billion, of which interest expenditure was € 5.569. Therefore, two key ratios* are:

·       Effective Interest Rate: 1.7%
·       Interest Share of Central Govnt Expenditure: 10.13%

United States Debt and Interest Rates

The United States Federal Debt was approximately $ 18 trillion at the end of December 2014. According to Wikipedia, US Federal Government expenditure was $ 3.77 trillion in FY2014. According to TreasuryDirect, the United States paid $ 430.8 billion in interest costs in FY2014. Therefore, two key ratios* are:

·       Effective Interest Rate: 2.4%
·       Interest Share of Central Govnt Expenditure: 11.6%

Comparing Greek and US Debt Costs

Just to make sure the full import of these calculations is understood:

·       Greece has a lower effective interest rate than the United States on its public sector debt.
·       Greece pays a lower share of its annual government budget to service the interest on that debt.


Greece
United States
Government Expenditure
€ 51 bln
$ 3.77 tln
Interest Costs
€ 5.57 bln
$ 430.8 bln
Effective Interest Rate
1.7%
2.4%
Interest Budget Share
11.0%
11.6%


So are Greece’s creditors loan sharks?

If we assume that Greece’s creditors are loan sharks, then we need to make the same assumption for all buyers of US Federal debt.

In a word, no, they are not. There is nothing usurious in an effective interest rate of 1.7%. Particularly not when Greek 10-year bonds are yielding 9.36% on 10-year GGB today.

Why can’t Greece Manage its Debt?

So the question remains: if Greek effective interest rates and debt service amounts are lower than in the United States, why can’t Greece manage its debt?

The first obvious reason is political instability. To put it mildly, the latest tactics and statements from both SYRIZA and New Democracy have caused investors to shun Greek debt as well as Greek equities since September 2014. And rightly so. The result of these tactics is a necessary and perfectly understandable aversion to lending more money to the Greek public sector.

The second reason is government incompetence in the area of tax collection. This is seen in at least three major examples:

a.     In April 2014, there were € 68 billion in private sector and household taxes owed to the government which could not be collected.

b.     In recorded instances of tax evasion, notably the Lagarde List or the list of Greeks who purchased property in London, successive governments have refused to do a systematic tax audit.

c.     The resignation of the Director for Revenue Collection Haris Theocharis in mid-2014, and the refusal of the government to appoint a new director, as well as recent distortions in the Greek tax code, indicate the true state of affairs. 


The third obvious reason is that Greece hasn’t reformed its public sector or implemented real structural reform. A good example of this is headcount reduction and restructuring in the public sector. What headcount has been achieved has mainly been done via early retirements, which simply shifts costs from the central government payroll to state pension funds. Of the 322 organisations that have been identified as useless, not a single one has been closed. The labour reserve has been a total failure.

The fourth reason is that what investments have occurred in Greece have been delayed. Three major privatisations, for instance—the Astir Hotel (€ 400 million), Hellenikon (€ 915 million), and the regional airports lease (€ 1.23 billion)—have taken place, but have not actually been completed. This means that investments of approximately € 10 billion are being held up due to public sector bureaucracy. There are many more examples of private sector investments which have been blocked by intractable public sector decision-making.

Conclusions

Today, the debate on Greek public debt remains convinced—in the total absence of facts and logic—that the Greek debt is unmanageable. The reality is far different. Greece’s debt is sustainable providing the public sector mobilises around real reforms: making the public sector more efficient; promoting investments; reducing needless red tape; promoting employment and entrepreneurship. Although almost every single political party claims allegiance to these objectives, not a single one appears to have a plan for them. The quality of public debate worsens with each week. Whether this is deliberate misinformation or simple ignorance, the result does not bode well for the future.  


(c) Philip Ammerman, 2015
This article was originally published on Navigator Consulting Group. 



* Note that the interest paid in 2014 reflects interest costs from 2013: the calculation of Greek and US debt ratios is done using the same [incorrect] temporal distribution. Greek budgets are done on a calendar-year basis (1 January – 31 December). US budgets are done on a fiscal year basis from 1 October – 30 September.


Tuesday, 18 June 2013

The ERT Litmus Test




Much has been said and written about the closure of the Greek broadcaster (ERT), the opening of a new, “transparent and axiocratic” one (NERIT), and the need for “reform” over the past week.

Everyone understands that ERT is over-staffed, has seen a “mission creep” in which it developed repetitive functions and invested in questionable assets and activities, and is corrupt, in that high salaries and questionable procurement contracts have been given to undeserving political appointees over decades. 

Moreover, everyone understands that these same problems are emblematic of the wider Greek public sector. Ironically, there is not a single Greek politician of any ideological stripe who has not condemned waste, corruption, nepotism, and a clientistic public sector. And yet both major parties (PASOK and ND) have looted the Greek public sector in the same manner. 

What Greek citizens and taxpayers (and their creditors) are waiting to see is whether this will change.

With the closing of ERT and the opening of NERIT, the Greek political system has a chance to put its heaving rhetoric into practise.

An external observer will be able to test the politicians by monitoring four simple issues:

a.     Who will Mr. Venizelos and Mr. Kouvelis appoint to lead ERT until NERIT is launched? Will this be a party hack with no relevant experience? Or will it be someone qualified to shape the difficult closure and liquidation fairly and transparently, and assure the launch of NERIT?

b.     What terms of reference will be granted to the European public broadcaster that will be hired to draft the NERIT strategic and operating plan? Will the broadcaster be given the resources and time to engage in a proper consultation, or will this be a “copy-paste” project like so many others? Will the recommendations be implemented in practise, e.g. in drafting the new NERIT law? Or will they, like so many other recommendations, collect dust on a shelf somewhere?

c.     What will be done to safeguard ERT's assets? Will asset stripping occur, as has occurred with so many other public organisations, or will a fair sales value be achieved? What steps will ERT/NERIT take to properly register and value all assets and record all transactions, e.g. on the internet, so that the public can see that fair value has been achieved?

d.     Who will New Democracy, PASOK and DIMAR appoint to the new Governing Council of NERIT once it is ready for operation? Will these be “new people”, or will they be the tired, mediocre faces of old who already pollute the Greek public sector, and who have characterised this coalition’s choices to date?

So far, the government has gotten the process and the politics of restructuring ERT wrong. Theoretically, they now have the chance to correct it. The next step is to see whether this correction occurs, and if the right people are appointed to lead it.

Somehow, I wouldn’t like to bet on that outcome.


© Philip Ammerman, 2013



http://www.philip-atticus.com/2013/06/killing-ert-to-save-it.html
12 June 2013

http://www.philip-atticus.com/2013/06/blog-post.html
15 June 2013

http://www.philip-atticus.com/2013/06/ert-to-re-open-yet-another-political.html
17 June 2013 

Monday, 17 June 2013

ERT to re-open; yet another Political Fiasco in Greece


(written on Monday, 17 July at 22:20)


Press reports indicate that Greece’s Superior Court has ruled that ERT, the public broadcaster, must re-open pending the development of a new public broadcaster. The final decision will be published tomorrow (Tuesday 17 June).

The reaction at the ERT headquarters on Messogheion Street is one of jubilation. The message here is interesting: commentators, apparently drawn from a Communist Party protest and members of the ERT union, are claiming a victory for justice, “the struggle”, and many other causes. This is the first public reaction, and together with Alexi Tsipras’ political rally in Constitution Square, will allow the current staff of ERT, as well as the broader left to define the debate on this issue.

It remains to be seen what the final decisions are.

In parallel, Skai News has published a plan proposed by Prime Minister Mr. Samaras for the restructuring of ERT (i.e. establishing NERIT, the new public broadcaster):

1.     Improving the cooperation of the three political parties in order to continue the current government and not to endanger the bail-out programme, the tourist season, the attraction of investment, and the investigation of issues such as the Lagarde List.

2.     Immediate constitution of a commonly-accepted Governing Committee to undertake the organisation and transmission of the TV signal until the new broadcaster can be constituted.

3.    Immediate vote on the NERIT law by the Parliament.

4.     Rapid implementation of staff recruitment measures in social sectors (hospitals, social structures, citizen service centres) to recruit the staff fired from ERT.

5.     Reaching an agreement with the BBC or other European public broadcaster to develop the strategic and operational plan of the New Greek Broadcaster.

6.    Nomination of a deputy minister exclusively responsible for the New Broadcaster, to be chosen by Mr. Venizelos and Mr. Kouvelis. Mr. Simos Kedikoglou remains as Government Spokesman and Vice Minister of Media.

7.     Restructuring of the Cabinet after the New Democracy party conference on 28-30 June.

8.    Updating the policy programme between the three political parties which comprise the government.

9.    Adapting procedures for the better coordination of the three parties, and the correct implementation of agreed policies.

If these points are true, and are implemented, then this can only be characterised as yet another very expensive fiasco for the credibility of the country, as well as Mr. Samaras personally.

On the one hand, everyone agrees ERT needs to reform. The uncertainty has always been about what constitute a “good” reform, given the tremendous, bipartisan corruption engendered by both PASOK and New Democracy during their various administrations over the past 35 years.

The fact that Mr. Samaras proceeded to liquidate ERT, forcing it off the air with less than 12 hours notice, is unprecedented and highly undemocratic. The fact that he did this without a replacement plan in place sufficient to convince a majority of the population that reform would work is nothing short of criminal folly.

This is confirmed by several points:

·       According to opinion polls, 65% of Greeks disagreed with the decision to disband ERT in the way it occurred

·       There is still no plan for the new broadcaster—the BBC or another public broadcaster will  be hired to draft one

·       The financial numbers bandied about by Mr. Kedikoglou made absolutely no sense to determining the future costs of NERIT, and how it would be funded

·       The international reaction against the manner of the ERT closure has been nothing short of unanimous against the decision. Greece’s international reputation has once again been dragged through the mud, thanks to the hooliganism of her political leadership.

The points published by Skai leave many points unanswered—chief of which is point 4, which I confess I do not fully understand. If I read it correctly, it means that the staff fired from ERT will be recruited by other public organisations.

If this is true, it is a decision of disastrous magnitude. It sends the message that (a) organised political occupation and protest will be sufficient to block any reform measures, no matter how well they are organised, and (b) it will be impossible to reduce the Greek public sector in any meaningful way.

And this is the point I have been trying to make over the past week: by launching on a haphazard, unprepared political adventure, Mr. Samaras has weakened his own standing as well as the cause of real reform.

The burden of proof has already been on the government (composed as it is of New Democracy and PASOK, who have done so much to ruin Greece in the past) to provide that it can operate in a sustainable, strategic and transparent way. Without this, the sacrifices made by millions of Greek citizens to cope with economic depression and high taxes are impossible. 

Yet once again, we see that both parties have failed entirely to provide a reasonable, cost-effective method of “reform”.

While I hope this lesson will have been taken to heart and that further efforts will be better prepared, there is regrettably little in recent Greek political history to provide evidence in support.


© Philip Ammerman, 2013


Related posts:

http://www.philip-atticus.com/2013/06/killing-ert-to-save-it.html
12 June 2013

http://www.philip-atticus.com/2013/06/blog-post.html
15 June 2013