General McChrystal and Afghanistan

I’ve just read Michael Hastings' Rolling Stone article on General Stanley McChrystal and America’s campaign in Afghanistan that yesterday resulted in his dismissal. It’s honestly been one of the most enjoyable articles I’ve read in weeks. General McChrystal sounds like a formidable Special Forces commander who probably never should have been put in charge of the campaign in Afghanistan. Not because he is unqualified or unsuited for command, but because the civilian authorities appear to be.

The paradox was that on the one hand, the US wanted a counterinsurgency strategy for Afghanistan, but on the other hand wants to do this by minimising civilian casualties and keeping military activities at a minimum. The two goals are admirable, but contradictory, at least in the way they have been translated into policy. For instance, the article described the reaction of troops at Combat Outpost JFM, who have been given laminated cards that say: "Patrol only in areas that you are reasonably certain that you will not have to defend yourselves with lethal force.” I’m trying, and failing, to think what part of Afghanistan that would be.

The article also points out a salient fact: that the main Taliban rear areas in Pakistan have been largely untouched by the ground campaign, except by aerial drone attacks. This means that, just as in Vietnam, the US army is fighting on behalf of a political leader with little apparent authority in his own country, while the enemy’s main force huddles in safety on the other side of the Pakistani border.

Add to this the fact that the surge has been slow in getting off the ground, and that it is timed to end next year. It seems that in terms of strategy, the campaign is bound to fail: all the enemy have to do is remain in the fight. By not losing, they win.

Either the US and its allies need to fight with every means at their disposal, or they need to find a way to reach some accommodation with the Taliban and withdraw. If these two options are unacceptable, then the campaign will continue as it is presently configured: an expensive and inconclusive effort, with no end in sight, and little possibility of victory. Hamid Karzai has come to precisely the latter conclusion, according to recent press reports.

As for General McChrystal: I got the impression of a tremendously competent man, a warrior, who should be out planning missions and kicking down doors than suffering through dinner in Paris. He sounds like a classic Special Forces officer in the impossible and undesirable position of managing a conventional war planned and stage-set from national capitals, against an unconventional enemy that he probably understands better than anyone else.

The “trash talk” so magnified by the press honestly seems insignificant. The group of officers in that hotel room were blowing off the not inconsiderable steam that comes from being in a combat zone. While it’s unfortunate their comments had to be relayed in this way, I’m sure hundreds of thousands of other American citizens, government employees and members of the Armed Forces share similar thoughts.

It’s also interesting to note the double standard at work. None of the comments made by McChrystal or his aides were as vitriolic as those made by one senator against another in the 2008 Presidential race. Or by one senator against the President in a State of the Union speech. Both senators and generals are supposed to be leaders, and both are paid by the government, right?

When do you remember a US senator ever resigning for something they’ve said?

The real cost of Virginia-class submarines

Yet another inaccuracy thrown up by the blogosphere, confirming that we should be checking our numbers very carefully indeed. Robert Scheer's article "A submarine to fight Al Quaida's navy" throws out the following statement: Example: the $81-billion submarine pushed by Sen. Joseph Lieberman, presumably to fight al-Qaida’s navy.

Quite apart from the disingenuity in maintaining that this submarine is intended to fight Al Quaeda, the cost is wrong. The CBO estimates that the cost per submarine will be between the original $ 2.1 billion budget price and $ 2.7 for the current Virginia class, and $ 3.2 billion for the Improved Virginia class. The Submarine Force Structure Study calls for 18 boats procured by 2015, with a further number coming into service thereafter. The CBO's estimates are based on 2 boats per year.

Perhaps Mr. Scheer refers to the Virginia programme costs: this should be specified, even if his overall conclusions are wrong.

In favour of $ 81 billion submarines

The SSN-774 Virginia, photo courtesy of Naval Technology.

Robert Scheer's article A Submarine to Fight al-Qaida’s Navy was posted on Truthdig on April 1st, 2008 and has received widespread coverage. While I appreciate his concern on military procurement as evidence of a wider imbalance on public spending, he over-simplifies the issue, and creates a wholly wrong impression on military procurement priorities and economics and how to solve their apparent problems.

Let's start with examining more carefully the logical premises behind his condemnation of the high-tech weapons systems he mentions, particularly the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and the Virginia-class submarine. It's important to ask ourselves a basic question: Are we against the principle of high technology weapons systems, or only their cost?

If we are against the principle of high-tech military capacity, we should remember that Al Quaeda is obviously not the opponent in mind when designing the capacities of either system: It is Russia and China. Russia recently launched its new Borei-class submarine has stepped up aviation patrols against US carrier forces, and has resumed standing strategic bombing patrols. Recent press reports indicate that after years of arms imports, China is reducing reliance on Russian systems in favour of domestically-produced platforms and components. We know that much of China's military budget is concealed in other line items, while it's recent anti-satellite missile test is a worrying indication of their intent and capacity.

Despite our understandable focus on the campaigns currently being fought in Afghanistan and Iraq, we should not neglect the wider strategic picture. Yes, America and the West won the Cold War, and thank goodness we did. Yet the dividends of peace lasted perhaps 15 years, approximately from 1989 to the middle part of the present decade, when Russian and Chinese intentions have become abundantly clear. The fact that the United States currently has no significant rival in conventional terms ignores the fact that both China and Russia have openly stated their intention develop the capacity to project force in sufficient degrees to counter US capabilities. We are not living in an ideal world, and to claim that US military policy is solely concerned with Al Quaeda is disingenuous, or perhaps simply naive.

If we are against the cost of new-generation military procurement, we should remember that a significant part of the technology in both the Virginia-class submarine and the F-35 JSF is new. I would estimate that between 20-35% of the cost is core R&D expenditure; an additional 10-15% will be in setting up and mastering production lines and engineering for what is an extremely complex system. Both systems push the envelope in terms of performance - the Virginia class being the most quiet in its class with unprecedented underwater warfare capabilities; the JSF as the most stealthy and maneuverable multiple-capacity platform of its generation, with air-to-air and air-to-ground roles. Both systems integrate new structural designs, electronics and power systems, which are not simply a question of reverse engineering or incremental changes.

The F-35 Lighting II JSF (c) Lockheed Martin, courtesy of the JSF Program Office

This is not a process similar to manufacturing Toyota Corollas, after all: it is more similar to manufacturing space shuttles or, indeed the space station itself. We should not be surprised by a delay in programme completion given this complexity. We should not be surprised if costs rise: inflation and rising materials costs alone (steel, tungsten, chromium, copper, etc) account for a large share of the cost increases. We should remember that these are not your standard consumer items, with a lifecycle of 2-5 years. Both the JSF and the Virginia class will be in service for the next 40 years, judging by past platforms such as the F-16 or the Ohio class.

In economics terms, we should remember that both systems are designed essentially for a single client - the US Department of Defence. Although the JSF does include international governments, the project is managed and led by the Pentagon, and rightly so. Whenever you have a single customer, it's inevitable that costs will rise and delays will occur. However, there are no easy alternatives for this, for obvious reasons. We don't want to make highly sensitive R&D and manufacturing capacity in this sector open to multiple clients, which would be one way of introducing competition, and therefore efficiency, into military procurement. We need instead to examine the structuring of production contracts and incentives, and most probably to re-design procurement and project management processes. Again, however, delays and cost over-runs on procurement programmes of this magnitude are almost certainly inevitable.

Finally, we need to remember that military and aerospace procurement leads to important collateral benefits: it employs extremely bright engineers and scientists and research institutions, while fostering high-complexity manufacturing at home. It leads to important spin-offs, such as the internet, GPS, Teflon and any number of other products. If we take a total lifecycle approach, we may find that government investment in military technology provides a net financial gain, as peculiar as this may sound.

We may agree that domestic and foreign policy has been particularly disagreeable under the Bush Administration, and that the "military-industrial" complex (or mentality) has created unfortunate results in wider US foreign policy. Whatever these negative impacts may be, I for one am happy if the US has a significant military edge over its rivals China and Russia, because the alternative is far too disturbing to contemplate.