Wednesday, 21 September 2011

Public Sector Employment in Greece – Myths and Realities



The debate over Greek public sector employment is characterised by a lack of real data and much stereotyping. In 2011, Greece’s public sector employment is 8% of the population and 18% of the active labour force. In the United States, public employment accounts for 7% of the total population and 15% of the labour force. Greece, however, has an extensive public provision of education and healthcare, whereas in the United States these functions are largely provide by the private sector. The OECD confirms this: "Greece has one of the lowest rates of public employment among OECD countries, with general government employing just 7.9% of the total labour force in 2008."
 
The latest Troika demands on Greece require—according to media reports last night--an immediate dismissal of up to 25,000 staff, hired since PASOK took power in 2009, as well as the placement into a labour reserve of a much larger number of staff, possibly up to 100,000 by 2015. It is impossible to confirm this as of Wednesday morning, since no official communiqué has been issued.

The issue of employment in the public sector is a difficult one to address, and not something which should normally be done as an immediate cost-cutting measure in a crisis of this magnitude. A primary factor for a rational debate on public sector employment is to understand and agree what Greece as a society expects from its public sector, and which tasks are consider it necessary.

This debate has largely been stifled by the growth in the public sector since PASOK first took power in 1981. This growth was characterised by introduction of left-wing unions into the civil service on a large scale, which had previously been banned by the military dictatorship which fell in 1974 and its precedents, dating back to the fears of a Communist take-over in 1944-1945. Together with this leftward shift in orientation came a large expansion in the role of the state, or at least in the financial expenditure the state was prepared to make. The history of Greece since then has been that of state expenditure expansion and contraction, of long periods of expansion followed by short periods of austerity.

Since Greece’s European Union entry, this process was heavily driven by EU funding and by the “convergence” philosophy. Greece was granted billions in structural and cohesion funds every year, intended to bring its infrastructure, institutions and private sector up to a competitive level so that it could achieve “convergence” with the existing EU member states. Part of this included the increase of wages in the public and private sectors. It is therefore ironic to hear today that Greek wages have increase more than German ones, and therefore must be cut. This increase in wages and in GDP/capita was precisely the point of convergence and the so-called “Objective 1“ regions.

This EU money was almost entirely channelled through ministries, which led in turn to the expansion of patronage and corruption in public contracts. No political party in Greece disputes this: most campaign on the premise that they will end corruption; then turn around and continue these practises once in power. Oddly enough, the EU never took real measures to prevent this, despite overwhelming evidence of common practise over time. I should add that neither occurrence is restricted to Greece.

The fact that EU funding was typically reimbursed after evidence of expenditure was made also contributed to Greece’s ballooning public debt: the government borrowed money to complete over-priced, inefficient projects, and ignored commercial reality. In many ways, EU funding played the same role as natural gas in Holland in the 1970s, or petroleum in Saudi Arabia today: a condition known as “Dutch disease.” This leads to the declining competitiveness of exports due to inflation, and in the case of Greece, a massive expansion of over-priced public sector projects financed through EU funds.

The end result of all this is a society and political system which finds itself in a struggle between what it views as public sector privilege and political spoils and the fact that the foreign money (loans or subsidies) to pay for this has run out. The focal point of this struggle is the public sector.

The debate as to what Greece wants from its public sector has never been held. There is no end of slogans, such as “free education for all”, or “permanent employment in the civil service” but these slogans do not reflect reality. We have not heard a debate or seen any analysis as to which sectors of the public sector deserve higher salaries and investments in productivity (and there are many such sectors), and which sectors require a down-sizing or restructuring. There is no global plan for liberalising state involvement in some sectors, such as education and healthcare, or for improving services to citizens through the use of egovernment.

And we are unlikely to hear this, as long as the public sector is associated with cost, and therefore costs which have to be cut as part of an austerity programme.

As with many things in Greece which emerge from the Troika or the government, there is a great deal of confusion and a lack of clear communication. But one of the “facts” being tossed about Greece lately is that there are more that 1 million people employed in the public sector, while others assert that Greece has one of the highest ratios of public sector employment in the world. One friend on Facebook made the assertion that Greece has more public employees than the United States.

I wanted to test these assertions to see if they were correct. As usual, data is fragmented, and several assumptions have been made. I will explain these in depth, comparing Greece to the United States. A comparison with France or Germany would be even more appropriate, finding data from these countries will take even more time. 

General government employees in Greece are numbered at 705,645 in the Mid-Term Fiscal Consolidation Plan approved by Greece in July 2011. The general government category includes national, regional and local (municipal) employees. The main problem is to understand how many employees are in the wider public sector, i.e. semi-governmental organisations (DEKO) and other state organisations with have the status of private sector legal registration. This number is impossible to access with any reliability: although the government has completed a census on this, I have not been able to find the final number.

I’ve taken the number of 175,000 as representing employment in this sector. Although this may seem low to most people, we have to remember that the government ownership share in many DEKO is actually quite low. It would be a mistake, in my opinion, to count OTE, the National Bank of Greece, and equivalent organisations in the wider public sector. However, it is also true that the government’s role as a shareholder in these DEKO affects labour law, pension spending and general productivity in these companies. The result seen, in any case, is my best estimate. If anyone can provide a better one, I would be pleased to re-run the numbers.

The total labour force in Greece is 4,967,200. This is defined as the segment of population over 15 years old which is not in education or training, and which is looking for work. (It therefore includes the unemployed). We should remember that one of the main problems with Greek economic competitiveness is the size of the active labour force: Greek women have one of the lowest employment rates in the European Union. Any future plan for improving the economy must focus on improving female employment and labour force participation.

The total population, according to the National Statistics Organisation (ELSTAT) was estimated at 11,257,290 in the first quarter of 2011. Thus, Greece’s public sector employment is 8% of the population, and 18% of the active labour force of the country. There was one public employee for every 13 citizens.


US
Greece
General Government
22,249,000
705,645
Wider Public Sector
574,000
175,000
Total Public Sector Employment
22,823,000
880,645
Total Labour Force
153,560,000
4,967,200
Total Population
312,257,855
11,257,290
Public Sector Employment as:


% Total Population
7%
8%
% Total Labour Force
15%
18%
Population per Public Employee
14
13


We can compare this with the United States, which has excellent labour statistics available on Census.gov and the Bureau of Labour Statistics. US general government employment in December 2010 is calculated at 22,249,000 people. This includes:

·       2,852,000 Federal Employees
·       5,142,000 State Employees (full and part time)
·       14,255,000 Local Employees (full and part time)

Not included in this are certain government agencies, such as the US Postal Service. I’ve included this as a separate line under “Wider Public Sector” employment, but have not been able to find a complete count.

The Bureau of Labour Statistics records 153,560,000 people in the active labour force in the first quarter of 2011. The Census.gov site records 312,257,855 total population on September 20th, 2011 (these dates do not match, but are presumably close enough and flatter the US results).

This yields a result of 7% public employment to the total population, and 15% of public employment in the total labour force. There are 14 people per public employ in the United States.

We should also remember that there is a big difference between the US and Greece in terms of public sector service provision. In Greece, for instance, healthcare and education are provided by the state; in the United States they are predominantly provided by the private sector. If “like-for-like” agencies were compared, it is highly likely that Greek and American public sector employment would be much more similar than we think.

My calculations are confirmed by the OECD, in its “Government at a Glance 2011 – Greece” publication, which quotes:

Greece has one of the lowest rates of public employment among OECD countries, with general government employing just 7.9% of the total labour force in 2008. This is a slight increase from 2000, when the rate was 6.8%. Across the OECD area, the share of government employment ranges from 6.7% to 29.3%, with an average of 15%. The Greek government has plans to further decrease this share, by replacing only 20% of staff leaving on retirement. Public employment is also highly centralised in Greece, with over 80% of staff working at the central government level.

So the question must be asked: will cutting the public sector, which has already suffered a massive decline in wages and headcount (there were a net 82,000 departures in 2010), yield results?

I have no doubt it will yield immediate financial results in the form of lower expenditure on salaries. However, I doubt it will render any further benefits beyond this, and the negative impacts will be far higher:

a.     Already, public sector workers are not working as effectively as possible in light of public sector cutbacks. This is particularly the case in the Revenue services, who are the tip to the spear in the current struggle to balance the budget.

b.     These public sector workers are all consumers. Once they are fired or “idled”, GDP and tax income fall through the elimination of this income.

c.     The loss of productivity for the remainder of the system will increase. Only if these workers are replaced with productivity enhancing processes, i.e. egovernment or elimination of authority-seeking processes, will there be a real impact on citizens and businesses.

d.     The unemployment rate will rise, creating further financial expenses (via unemployment payments) as well as a downward, long-term drag on GDP.

Perhaps most seriously, this step risks mobilising all public sector workers against the Troika and against the PASOK government. And if the government falls, there is no realistic political alternative for the Troika’s plan.

As I have written before: the financial shortfall so far in 2011 is minor and is attributed to rational policy choices. The negative economic impacts of the austerity programme as well as structural economic factors are going to increase as we go into the winter, creating a greater fall in GDP and a greater rise in unemployment.

By implementing these reported measures, the Troika risks fundamentally de-railing the Greek reform programme. They are unnecessary, and a high price to pay for a very small and short-term economic return. There are other alternatives available, and these should be explored first.


© Philip Ammerman, 2011

Tuesday, 20 September 2011

Italy Downgrade

As predicted in my post Sleepwalking into Disaster just two days ago, Italy has been downgraded by Standard & Poor’s today. It’s only a question of time before the remaining ratings agencies follow.

Italy and several other Eurozone countries are facing a credit rating monitoring starting this week. In my opinion, the outlook is negative. A ratings downgrade of Italy may be averted, but is unlikely. I forecast a 55-65% chance of a ratings downgrade. This will set off yet another financial firestorm, both in terms of bond yields of other at-risk countries, as well as in shares of banks exposed to Italy. Beware a run on France.

The market results will be immediate, and will likely lead to contagion in France by the end of the week. As quoted in the Financial Times: 


S&P cited Italy’s “weakening economic growth prospects” and the difficulty of the “fragile governing coalition” being able to “respond decisively” to the crisis.

“This is a downgrade of EU and Italian politicians,” said Sony Kapoor, head of Redefine, a Brussels-based economic think-tank. “The miserable failure of EU leaders to tackle the problems posed by Greece does little to inspire any confidence that the much larger and more urgent problems faced by Italy would be managed any better.”


Unless urgent measures are taken, including a radical expansion of EFSF and an explicit commitment that between the ECB and the EFSF, the Eurozone has at least EUR 2 trillion at its disposal to refinance its member states, the results are going to be dire as we move towards December 2011.


© Philip Ammerman

Monday, 19 September 2011

Unreal


Watching Antonis Samaras’ speech at the Thessaloniki International Exhibition, the only word I could think of to describe his performance was “unreal.”

The entire speech sounded like an election campaign speech: lots of criticism, lots of promises, no real plan for the immediate future.

Some statements were simply absurd. Here’s one example:

Όταν ματαίωσε και τα μέτρα που είχε προγραμματίσει η προηγούμενη κυβέρνηση. Όταν συνέχισε να μοιράζει «παροχές»! Κι όλα αυτά στοίχησαν στον Προϋπολογισμό της χρονιάς εκείνης σχεδόν 10 δισεκατομμύρια! Τα 10 από τα 36 δισεκατομμύρια έλλειμμα του 2009 ήταν δημιούργημα του τελευταίου τρίμηνου!

Mr. Samaras claims that EUR 10 bln of the EUR 36 bln final deficit in 2009 was due to cancelled actions that the ND government “had planned,” and due to hand-outs. This statement ignores the fact that much of ND’s campaign promises in 2009 were based on cuts, which had not been implemented, let alone planned. They were campaign promises. It also ignores the fact that in the 6 years Prime Minister Karamanlis was in power, Greece’s deficit increased by at least EUR 143 bln. This is exclusively the responsibility of the ND government, of which Antonis Samaras was a minister.

Here’s another example:

Όμως, η ελληνική φύση δεν δίνει μόνο προϊόντα. Έχει και μοναδικές ομορφιές. Ο Τουρισμός είναι ήδη ένας από τους δύο «πρωταθλητές» μας. Αλλά μπορούμε πολύ περισσότερα....
Που είναι οι μαρίνες που έπρεπε να είχαμε εδώ και χρόνια; Που είναι τα θαλάσσια και υποθαλάσσια πάρκα; Που είναι τα οργανωμένα σκάφη που θα μπορούσαν να οργώνουν κατά χιλιάδες τις θάλασσές μας και να προσφέρουν μοναδικές υπηρεσίες σε προσιτές τιμές σε εκατοντάδες χιλιάδες επισκέπτες; Που είναι τα θεματικά πάρκα; Που είναι οι σύγχρονες ψηφιακές υποδομές στα Μουσεία μας, που θα μπορούσαν να αναδείξουν την Ελλάδα σε μοναδικό διεθνή προορισμό, για εκατοντάδες χιλιάδες μαθητές ή φοιτητές, απ’ όλο τον κόσμο, συνδυάζοντας μια μοναδική πολιτιστική εμπειρία με αναψυχή; 

Mr. Samaras is asking where are the marinas, the marine parks, etc. He asks this of George Papandreou, but he should have been asking Constantinos Karamanlis, who was sitting in the front row of the exhibition hall. Karamanlis not only did very little for tourism, but his Minister of Tourism, Aris Spiliotopoulos, left a shambles at the Ministry of Tourism, including questionable procurement on yacht rentals and hotel suites and unpaid bills at World Travel Market. EOT’s unpaid bills for international advertising campaigns numbered in the millions, and a major problem for Greece both in the past, and today. The fact that after this abysmal performance, Mr. Aris Spiliotopoulos is now ND’s shadow minister of Education says a lot.

Με την Εφεδρεία που προτείνουμε εμείς, μαζί με το πλήρες πάγωμα προσλήψεων για μια τριετία (με εξαίρεση υπέρ-επείγουσες ανάγκες σε Άμυνα, Παιδεία και Υγεία), μπορεί να μειωθεί σε τρία χρόνια το προσωπικό του δημοσίου κατά 150 χιλιάδες! Με καθαρό όφελος για το κράτος περίπου 2 δισεκατομμύρια το χρόνο. Και χωρίς απολύσεις…

Mr. Samaras also spoke about the “labour reserve” and reducing headcount in the civil service. He promised to freeze recruitment for one year, leading to a total reduction of 150,000 staff in three years. Is he not aware that both options are currently being implemented? The only difference is that his labour reserve is for three years, while PASOK’s is for one year. Overall, I prefer one year and departure, rather than three years and yet more money spent on “training.” Greece’s public service ills are not going to be solved through training, without a far more comprehensive framework. The latter has not been explored in any serious depth by either party.

Θα ελέγξουμε αναδρομικά την περιουσιακή κατάσταση όσων κατέλαβαν δημόσιες θέσεις, υπουργικούς θώκους κλπ., από τη Μεταπολίτευση μέχρι σήμερα. Το έχω υποσχεθεί και θα το κάνω! Για να έλθουν στην επιφάνεια όλες οι περιπτώσεις «περίεργου» πλουτισμού. Και θα θεσπίσουμε μέτρα για να μην επαναληφθεί ποτέ πια. Αυτός ο νόμος της σιωπής, αυτή η «ομερτά» για το «πολιτικό χρήμα», θα σπάσει!

There was at least one entertaining promise: ND will conduct a forensic audit on all public servants and ministers from 1974 onwards. “The “omerta” of “political cash” will break!” promised Mr. Samaras. I sincerely look forwards to this. I suggest that first on the list should be the financing of “Politiki Anoixi” (Political Spring), Mr. Samaras’ party, founded in 1992. They should also check the financing of ND by Siemens and Intracom. They should open up once again the structured bond scandals, Vatopedi, and the scandalous allocation of EU and OPAP funds during the Karamanlis years. This will be highly instructive. It has as many chances of occurring as I have of becoming President of the United States.

And yet, I think of what might have been. I think of the political impact Mr. Samaras would have created had he come to Thessaloniki and said the following few words:

“My fellow citizens, I come to you not with more impossible promises which you have heard before, not with more excuses for past failures, nor with unachievable dreams for the future.

I come instead with an offer: that we will put our differences behind us and join in a government of national unity with Mr. Papandreou and PASOK for a period of 2 years until the original term of PASOK is over in October 2013.

During the next two years, we will implement the following policies:

a.     We will achieve a primary surplus by the beginning of 2013. 2012 will be the last year of a primary deficit, which we target at 3.5-4% of GDP.

b.     We will implement the Mid-term Fiscal Adjustment Programme and our promises to our European creditors to the best of our ability. This will cause undeniable economic pain, but we have no other choice, absent a real default.

c.     We will lay the groundwork for a competitive tax environment as far as is possible given the economic crisis. We will pursue tax evasion with far more effective and direct measures, both within Greece but also outside it, so that the financial crimes which have occurred for far too long will be prosecuted and resolved.

As a condition for participation, we ask that the cabinet be restructured to include the following six major Ministries, three of which should be given to representatives we select:

·       Ministry for Investment and Privatisation separate from the Ministry of Finance
·       Ministry of Energy separate from the Ministry of Environment
·       Ministry of Shipping separate from the Ministry of Development

We call Mr. Papandreou to join us in an emergency planning session to achieve these goals by the end of September, leading to a Government of National Unity on October 1st. We suggest that both PASOK and we appoint the best people we have at our disposal to these positions.  

My fellow citizens, we, the political class of Greece, have failed you. Whether on the right or on the left, great crimes have been committed in the name of political power and economic benefit. The results should be clear to everyone today.

But if we are to survive, we must put the past behind us. We must fulfil the promises we have made, and save Greece from bankruptcy. The following two years will be full of hardship, but with the grace of God, the help of our diaspora and our European friends, and the hard work Greeks are known for, we will prevail.”


© Philip Ammerman, 2011
www.navigator-consulting.com

Sunday, 18 September 2011

Sleepwalking into Disaster


The conclusions of the Eurozone financial council and central bank governors meeting which took place in Wroclaw, Poland these past two days resulted in no major new commitments or measures. Given the rapid pace of events, this non-decision is likely to feed the flames of a financial disaster later this month, and into October.

The date of the decision of the eventual disbursement of the sixth Greek instalment of the first bail-out package was pushed back to mid-October at the earliest, pending a Troika review at the beginning of October. Greece was asked to provide more details on its fiscal consolidation plan, which is code for introducing yet more measures.

No decision was taken on two other critical issues: alternatives for EFSF capitalisation, and capital support for the European banking system. This is likely to be the greatest policy-making fault on the European, and global levels, and will soon put Europe further behind the policy curve, where it’s been all along.

US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner was invited to this meeting and made two important proposals:

(a) that Europe leverage the capital of the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) in the same way the New York Federal Reserve was able to leverage its assets to deal with the 2008 banking crisis, and

(b) that Germany and other rich nations provide, directly or indirectly, additional financial stimulus. This could have been provided by the European Central Bank, had German resistance to its bond-buying programme not been as vehement.

Geithner’s recommendations were shot down. The EFSF capital expansion will continue to wind its slow way through European capitals, with a final decision hopefully made in October. Jean-Claude Juncker was quoted by Reuters as saying that

"We are not discussing the expansion or increase of the EFSF with a non-member of the euro area," he told reporters. He also ruled out any further fiscal stimulus, something Washington has also called for. "Fiscal consolidation remains a top priority for the euro area," he said.

The difference with US policy-making at the height of the financial crisis in 2008 could not be greater. Not only did the Federal Reserve and the US Treasury launch a massive financial stimulus (TARP, TALF), quantitative easing, and emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) programmes, but they extended this to all banks, not just American banks. I found these comments unacceptable:

·   Has Europe forgotten the emergency liquidity assistance provided by the US Federal Reserve to European banks such as Royal Bank of Scotland ($84.5 bln); Hypo Real Estate Holdings ($28.7 bln), Dexia, and Societe Generale?

·     Has Europe forgotten the fact that the TARP funds bailed out European AIG counterparties such as Deutsche Bank and others at face value in 2008-2009?

·      Is Europe ignorant of the fact that the Fed provided a massive recapitalisation of European banks via the QE2 programme, and that 8 of 22 primary dealers are European?

It’s fully indicative of the provincial approach taken by European policy-makers on this subject. Instead of listening to one of the point men on the US crisis, this turned into yet another “Europe vs. USA” moment.

Geithner also made one extremely good comment this week:

“What is very damaging (in Europe) from the outside is not the divisiveness about the broader debate, about strategy, but about the ongoing conflict between governments and the central bank, and you need both to work together to do what is essential to the resolution of any crisis,” he said.

“Governments and central banks have to take out the catastrophic risks from markets … (and avoid) loose talk about dismantling the institutions of the euro.”

No comment necessary: he is exactly right.

So why are we sleepwalking into disaster? The following reasons apply. I’ll probably be repeating them in one form or another each week.

1.   Europe has not gotten a handle on the Greek debt crisis, or Greek contagion. Greece’s slippage on fiscal consolidation is insignificant and is fully explained by rational policy choices. We have already seen the massive erosion of market confidence at the end of last week: this is now set to continue as a result of an extremely poor Troika management of the situation. On the other hand, Greece’s overshot on higher taxes and lower expenditure forced by recent Troika decisions will push the country into depression. Instead of looking for ways of saving the Greek bail-out, Troika policy and public comments appear to be ready to destroy it.

2.   Italy and several other Eurozone countries are facing a credit rating monitoring starting this week. In my opinion, the outlook is negative. A ratings downgrade of Italy may be averted, but is unlikely. I forecast a 55-65% chance of a ratings downgrade. This will set off yet another financial firestorm, both in terms of bond yields of other at-risk countries, as well as in shares of banks exposed to Italy. Beware a run on France.

3.  Progress of ratification and expansion of EFSF lending is too slow, too low and now hindered by German decision-making based on the decision of the German High Court.

4.  The European Central Bank has not been fully allowed to extend emergency liquidity assistance or buy bonds, again largely due to German decision-making. This means that the prime function of Europe’s Central Bank has been hobbled.

5.     European banks need an urgent recapitalisation, estimated by the IMF to be in the region of EUR 200 bln. The European policy response has been to ignore this. The recent stress tests do not take a realistic sovereign bond mark-down into effect. There are also  any number of toxic debts in the European system, not least of which are commercial real estate.

6.   Economic growth is slowing due to market contagion, consumer fear and lower capital spending. Chinese weakness is visible: all signs (oil prices, shipping rates, Chinese port traffic) point to an anaemic or declining global economy. Far too much of UK and French growth remains attributed to unreasonably high property values.

7.     With the summer over, unemployment in Europe and America is likely to increase.

8.   The chances of another “Black Swan” event remain elevated. Whether this will be a run on European bank deposits or contagion in French bonds or a conflict in the Persian Gulf is unknown. But it is likely just around the corner. The lack of coordinated policy and the lack of financial reserves in the European banking and sovereign funding systems means that Europe is exposed.

9.   Over the longer term, European political differences are increasing, while domestic political stability is increasingly fragile. Neither Angela Merkel nor Nicholas Sarkozy enjoys a strong political position. Italian politics remain fragmented. Barack Obama enters another pre-election period. Decision-making in the next 12-18 months will be even worse than usual. We see this most vividly in the CDU-FDP-CSU imbroglio on a Greek default.

I know believe that no matter which scenario plays out, the greatest threat will be a liquidity and solvency crisis in the European banking system. Given the roller-coaster bank share prices in the last month, this opinion is widely shared.

If anyone knows of a stable bank in a stable country (Norway? Canada?) with no exposure to European bonds and no dodgy derivatives contracts or rogue traders or large amounts of Florida property loans, I’m looking to shift accounts.


© Philip Ammerman, 2011

Friday, 16 September 2011

Greek Debt Crisis Reading List


Some interesting articles or opinion pieces from the international press published recently provide a good picture of the current situation in Greece.

George Soros, Reuters: September 14, 2011

This opinion piece explores the link between the 2008 banking / mortgage collapse and the 2010 sovereign debt crisis. It contrasts the US approach to crisis management, where the US Treasury Department, the national and regional Federal Reserves, and the banks acted fairly quickly to provide emergency liquidity assistance and restore faith in the banking system. The article is excellent in pointing out the missing link in the Euro: the lack of a common treasury, and the contrasting roles played by the European Central Bank and the European Financial Stability Fund. It also correctly places this in the political context, which is critical to understanding part of the failure of policy. An interesting quote from the piece:

In 2008 the U.S. financial authorities that were needed to respond to the crisis were in place; at present in the eurozone one of these authorities, the common treasury, has yet to be brought into existence. This requires a political process involving a number of sovereign states. That is what has made the problem so severe. The political will to create a common European treasury was absent in the first place; and since the time when the euro was created the political cohesion of the European Union has greatly deteriorated. As a result there is no clearly visible solution to the euro crisis. In its absence the authorities have been trying to buy time.
In an ordinary financial crisis this tactic works: with the passage of time the panic subsides and confidence returns. But in this case time has been working against the authorities. Since the political will is missing, the problems continue to grow larger while the politics are also becoming more poisonous.

Jeffrey Sachs. Financial Times (registration required)

One of the first opinion pieces pushing back against the comments by FDP leader and Minister for Economics Philipp Roesler and CSU leader and governor of Bavaria Horst Seehofer, who’s comments last week did so much to destabilise the Euro and the markets. It also confirms comments made in my earlier post, that Greece’s missing its fiscal targets so far this year is relatively modest given the scale of reforms made to date.


Peter Spiegel. Financial Times (registration required): September 5, 2011

An interview with former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, in which he presses for a more reasonable approach to the Greek reform programme timeline, and links the domestic political pressures in Germany which lead to “Greece bashing”.

 “What we expect of Greece right now, the question is can that really be achieved? The Greek government is trying to introduce austerity programmes that are unprecedented,” he said, warning social unrest was a “great possibility” given the country’s continued economic contraction.

“Europeans in general should not stop expecting reforms from Greece, but Greece should get more time to introduce them.” …

Ms Merkel inappropriately played on German resentment towards Greece, he said, a mistake that now prevents her from winning public support for measures he believes are necessary to solving the crisis, including the creation of bonds backed by all 17 eurozone countries.

Mr Schröder specifically singled out Ms Merkel’s widely reported assertion that Greeks worked less hard and took more holidays than Germans, a claim he said was wrong and was “a huge mistake” politically.

“In the first months of the Greek crisis, Merkel looked too much at public opinion and she participated in this bashing of Greece,” he said. “Her position has definitely changed but it is now very difficult for her to introduce that kind of thing in her own party.”


Wolfgang Muenchau. Financial Times (registration required): September 5, 2011

A superlative article on why the structure of Eurozone institutions are preventing a rapid resolution to the crisis. Again, contrast this with the US Federal Reserve and its operations following the September-October 2008 crisis in the United States.

This policy paralysis, together with domestic political considerations, the demographic change in Europe, and declining competitiveness at the microeconomic level are the main reasons I am so negative about the future. It is hard to see how the entire western structure of “social partnership” can be maintained in the world we currently live in, without radical reform. This comments is not ideological comment, but quantitative, based on what I’m seeing in companies and sectors on a daily basis.


Der Spiegel International: September 13, 2011

A review of German press and its analysis of political comments made in the last two weeks on the debt crisis. In English. 


Peter Spiegel & Karin Hope. Financial Times: September 12, 2011

An excellent and timely analysis of the structure and challenges facing the second Greek bail-out. These factors, together with some other ones, were the reasoning behind my blog post: Continued Risks in the Greek Reform Programme (August 22, 2011). Yet unless this second package is passed, and quickly, there is almost no hope that the Greek debt crisis will be resolved without a real, “hard” default.


© Philip Ammerman, 2011