Wednesday, 25 January 2012

Theodoros Angelopoulos



A while ago this morning, en route to Athens Airport, I heard the news that Theodoros Angelopoulos had died yesterday evening in a traffic accident. He was hit by a motorcycle while crossing the road in Drapetsona and died in hospital several hours later. 

A renown film director, Angelopoulos’ work explores the cultural and historical identity of Greece in the years from World War II to the present day. His films touched on some of the most sensitive points of modern Greek history, ranging from returning home from the Greek civil war (Voyage to Cythera) to family loss and discovery (Landscape in the Mist) to the loss of cultural identity in the years of prosperity (The Beekeeper).

He was often not an easy man to work with. I remember clearly his public disappointment and sarcasm at not being awarded at the Cannes Film Festival; others will no doubt look at his selection of foreign leading roles and his treatment of younger Greek filmmakers with some criticism.

His films were also difficult to watch. You don’t go to an Angelopoulos film for thrills or laughs: emotional devastation was typically the result. His use of a limited number of long scenes and complex dialogues became something of a trademark.

And despite his fame, he suffered through all the indignities of a filmmaker in Greece, from limited budgets and resources (despite state funding) to high overhead costs to a very limited domestic market. His contempt for what he termed “commercial” films, television or advertising only complicated matters.

Yet his films have captured, in their own way, life in Greece for a certain period of time, from the traditional Greece of the 1960s-1970s to the transition to prosperity in the 1980s and the wrenching adjustments following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the large-scale immigration which followed. His focus on issues of family loss and reunion are stunning in their clarity: I had a relative who fought on the Communist side in the civil war. He was repatriated to Uzbekistan at the end of the war, returning to Greece in the 1970s. I can’t imagine what “Uncle John” went through, but Voyage to Cythera was probably close to it.

I feel shock and sadness at his loss. A lifetime of creative struggle killed by a motorcycle in a common traffic accident in Athens. The driver is rumoured to be an off-duty policeman.

A long time ago, I heard a song by Ioannis Markopoulos which I can never forget. I remember this now, thinking of Angelopoulos and what his loss means for Greece.

Rest in peace.


Στην κυρά μάνα μας μη δίνεται βοήθεια
ούτε μαγκούρα στο προσκέφαλο σιμά
γιατί θα δέρνει κάθε μέρα τα παιδιά της
κι όταν μιλάω θα με λέει αληταρά
κι αν δέρνει κάθε που γουστάρει τα παιδιά της
θα καταντήσουνε εμπόροι δουλικοί
τα νιάτα χάνονται στα βρόμικα σοκάκια
για να μετρήσουν με το μπόι τους τη γη

Λένγκω, Λένγκω, Λένγκω
πάψε να με κυβερνάς
Λένγκω, Λένγκω, Λένγκω
πάψε να με τυραννάς

Κι αν θέλω τώρα να ακούγεται η φωνή μου
με πιάνει τρόμος από ίσκιους μακρινούς
χρυσάφι μοιάζει η συντροφιά σου στη ζωή μου
κι η ομορφιά σου μου γιατρεύει τους καημούς
ρε μπάρμπα κάτσε να μας πεις μιά ιστορία
πως ήταν τότες η μανούλα μας παλιά
έπεφτε ξύλο σα γινόταν φασαρία
ή σας νανούριζε με χάδια και φιλιά

Λένγκω, Λένγκω, Λένγκω
μου σπαράζεις την καρδιά
Λένγκω, Λένγκω, Λένγκω
μου πληγώνεις τη χαρά

Κι ο μπάρμπας τότε σοβαρεύτηκε λιγάκι
τη κούτρα ξύνει και παράγγειλε καφέ
η μητέρα είπε ήταν ένα κοριτσάκι
που ορφανό μάζευε άνθη σε μπαξέ
τ΄άνθη στόλιζαν το αγέρωχο κεφάλι
μα όταν κοιμόταν πάλι πέφτανε στη γη
κι από τα λούλουδα που ο χάρος είχε βάλει
εμένα κράτησε να βλέπω τη ζωή

Λένγκω, Λένγκω, Λένγκω, Λένγκω
μου΄χεις φάει τη ψυχή
Λένγκω, Λένγκω, Λένγκω
φίλοι θα βρεθούμε όλοι μαζί

Αυτή παιδιά μου ήταν τότες η μανούλα
ο κήπος ύστερα εγέμισε ληστές
το κοριτσάκι μας το ντύσανε γριούλα
κι απ΄τα κουρέλια φαινότανε οι πληγές
κι αν μας χτυπάει με μανία και φωνάζει
τη βάζουν άλλοι με συμφέροντα πολλά
το όνειρο που φεύγει τη τρομάζει
να αναζητάει μιά χαμένη ελευτεριά

Λένγκω, Λένγκω, Λένγκω μάνα
στο καμίνι της φωτιάς
Λένγκω, Λένγκω, Λένγκω μάνα
πες μας πάλι τι ζητάς 

(Thanks to Gugalyrics)

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© Philip Ammerman, 2012
Navigator Consulting Group

Monday, 23 January 2012

Waiting for Godot



In Samuel Beckett’s adaptation of Waiting for Godot, Estragon and Vladimir explore the absurdities of life while waiting for a largely fictional character named Godot. “Nothing to be done”, exclaims Estragon, trying to remove his boot. “We’re saved!” they both exclaim, a little bit later in the first act. 

This week, if media reports are to be believed, the Greek PSI will finally be agreed. This adventure in net present value and coupon rate negotiations has reached the final stage of the absurd, to the point where it would almost make little difference to a bewildered public or to an exhausted financial sector whether it occurs or not. It reminds me of nothing more than Waiting for Godot—that illusory moment of salvation which will probably not arrive in this act or the next.

The “Private Sector Involvement” (PSI) is the preferred, more elegant term than the common “haircut”, and refers quite simply to the fact that Greece is no longer able to service her public debt. Rather than repaying 100% of it, will repay (if reports are to be believed), 50% of it or less.  It is interesting to note just how much time was spent in 2010 assuring the world that this was not the case.

This process originally started in May 2011 with an offer for a 21% voluntary PSI, offered by the financial sector. Unfortunately, the 21% apparently referred to net present value, i.e. the present value of the expected future cash flows from Greek bonds, less the present value of the bond itself.

Using NPV to determine a “haircut” in these circumstances is tricky, to say the least, for the simple reason that nominal rather than real bond value prices were used. In other words, the NPV treated a EUR 10 million Greek bond as being worth EUR 10 million, as opposed to its market rate which was probably discounted by at least 50%. This means that financial investors were receiving a 29% “bonus” over actual market rates (more, in fact).

While the “Troika” initially accepted this offer in July 2011, they then reneged in September-October 2011, led by Germany. Germany’s insistence on a greater NPV haircut of about 50% was certainly more in line with market valuation, but in turn led to greater “contagion.” This means that banks and other financial investors refused to purchase bonds of other Eurozone periphery countries (a politer term than PIIGS – Portgual, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain), causing their interest rates to skyrocket, and leading to a real scenario of a financial meltdown.

By December 2011, Germany had retracted, stating that the Greek PSI was a “one-time”, unique event, but insisting that the PSI move forward.

Complicating the issue of PSI are three additional factors:

·       The 50%+ PSI must be considered “voluntary” in order to avoid triggering credit default swaps (CDS). This is essentially a form of insurance against a sovereign bond default worked out between market actors. What’s the problem? If a “haircut” is “involuntary” (which is absurd, because the financial sector clearly does not want a write-down), then the CDS clause can be triggered, enabling investors to claim back 100% of their Greek bond values.

·       The fact that a number of hedge funds and other investors have invested in Greek bonds at a discounted rate. The fact that these investors are probably thinly capitalized and understandably aggressive in terms of their negotiating strategy means that they have less to gain from a PSI of over 50%. So they’ve been blocking a deal, if press reports are to believed, on terms offered by Greece (with instruction given by Germany & co).

·       The fact that a PSI of 50% will essentially wipe out the Greek pension and banking system, given that fact that Greek investor hold about EUR 70 billion of Greek government bonds. Oops.

There are in fact several additional complications, but the situation is clearly absurd enough as it is that we don’t need to go any further. I hope.

Godot has very nearly arrived—or perhaps not—in the PSI negotiations. We understand that Greek bonds will be exchanged for new ones with a 30-year maturity and a coupon (an annual interest rate) of 4% or slightly less, on average.

And yet, Greece is not yet saved. The PSI actually has to be financed by who else but … the Troika (enter stage left). Greece will receive further loans of between EUR 130-140 billion to finance not just the PSI but also the recapitalisation of its banking/pension system, part of its annual public sector operations, and a “sweetener” for the private financial sector to accept the PSI deal.

This further loan is in turn contingent on several additional factors, including:

a.     Further Greek austerity measures, including evidence that the Greek political parties back them, and evidence that the current set of austerity measures is working

b.     The agreement of Eurozone national parliaments on the second Greek bailout

c.     An IMF agreement that the Greek debt is sustainable even with a 50% PSI (the IMF has already indicated that a greater PSI is needed)

d.     The ability of the Eurozone countries to actually raise money to do this—which is far from assured given current market conditions.

This entire farcical process is complicated, or undermined, by two additional facts:

·       There is absolutely no success narrative. Press reports circulate an entirely unsubstantiated comment that the PSI will reduce Greek debt:GDP from 160% to 120% in 2020. This is absurd, as it confuses current debt-to-GDP (160%) with 2020 debt-to-GDP (120%), and ignores the many other structural reforms and privatisation issues required.

·       There is no clear public set of calculations where voters, financiers, and others can clearly understand the dynamics of the Greek debt and economic reform programme. This adds to confusion, particularly among a largely hysterical press.  

As with the entire process that started since May 2010 when the first bail-out package was announced, we have allowed the process to dominate the solution, rather than the solution itself. The process is fundamentally flawed, as it involves the total loss of national sovereignty and a contradictory and unworkable first bail-out plan. Beyond this, it is clear that although some useful work has been done, and more is planned, the underlying root causes of the Greek situation have been ignored.

As such, the Troika, the Greek government and the financial sector have allowed a relatively simple process of public debt restructuring to balloon into an existential crisis affecting the world financial system, at least according to the Financial Times, Wall Street Journal, Bloomberg and other worthies.

To say that this is absurd is an understatement. But wait...the doorbell rings. I think Godot has arrived.


© Philip Ammerman, 2012

Wednesday, 18 January 2012

Reading Plutarch in Geraka



One of the most appropriate passages I’ve ever read about Greece, ancient, Byzantine or modern, is the Introduction to the Penguin Classic edition of Plutarch: Makers of Rome, translated by Ian Scott-Kilvert (1965). I came across this at Princeton in 1989, and it has stayed with me ever since. I take the liberty of transcribing part of the Introduction of the 1965 edition here.

************

Two themes dominate the cycle of Plutarch’s Roman Lives, the valour and tenacity of the Roman people in war, and their genius for political compromise. The creators of the pax Romana were first of all children of Mars, and so Plutarch depicts them, often defeated by never subdued, and in the end triumphant over one dreaded enemy after another, the Volscians, the Gauls, Pyrrhus and his elephants, the Carthaginians and their matchless cavalry. Lastly the army moves into politics, the enemies of the Republic become her own legions led by their contending generals, and the clash of arms is only finally stilled when, after the victory of Actium, Octavius Caesar symbolically closes the ever-open doors of the temple of Janus.

This brings us to Plutarch’s second motif, the problems of statecraft and the struggle for power between patricians and plebeian, the Senate and the popular leaders. It is here, for all the ruthlessness of Roman political life, that Plutarch pays tribute to the political instinct, the ability to close ranks in a moment of crisis, which eventually raised this tribal confederation of Italian farmers to the mastery of the world – and the absence of which proved the ruin of the Greek city-state.

The tragedy of Greece and the triumph of Rome form the political poles of the Lives viewed as a whole, and Plutarch passes judgment on his fellow countrymen in a memorably passage from The Life of Flaminius:

For if we except the victory of Marathon, the sea-fight at Salamis, the battles of Plataea and Thermopylae, and Cimon’s exploits at Eurymedon…Greece fought all her battles against and to enslave herself. Every one of her trophies stands as a memorial to her own shame and misfortune, and she owed her ruin above all to the misdeeds and the rivalries of her leaders.

The peculiarly Roman virtues as Plutarch sees them – best exemplified perhaps in the careers of Fabius, Marcellus and Sertorius – include not only courage and the power of leadership, but also generosity and forbearance, the qualities which create harmony between rulers and ruled. But the real source of Roman supremacy and object of Plutarch’s admiration is “the idea of Rome”, a spiritual heritage undreamed of in Greece, which at moments of supreme crisis seems to descend upon the city’s fallible representatives, to work through them and to shape their ends.

******

Today, in the midst of a wrenching economic crisis which illuminates the self-destructive tendencies of Greece’s political elite and of many segments of her population, these words seem more relevant than ever.

Ironically enough, Plutarch hailed from Chaeronea in Boeotia, today an otherwise unremarkable village near Levadia we drive by while en route to Delphi. I have often wondered why Chaeronea’s most famous son is not honoured with a museum, or even a simple sign along the road, and why Chaeronea is not on any tourist routes.

Another brief transcription from the summary:

*******

Plutarch was one of the last of the classical Greek historians. He was born in about AD 45 at Chaeronea in Boeotia, where he later had a schook, and in middle age took up a priesthood at near-bye Delphi.

When Nero visited Greece in AD 66, Plutarch was a student at Athens. He became a philosopher, a man capable of lecturing and discussing on many learned topics, and wrote a large number of essays and dialogues on philosophical, scientific and literary subjects (the Moralia). He adopted the philosophic standpoint of a Platonist, and frequently attacked both Stoics and Epicureans. He wrote his historical works somewhat late in life, and his Parallel Lives of eminent Greeks and Romans is probably his best-known and most influential work (their translation by North was used by Shakespeare as a source for his Roman plays).

*******

Some additional resources:

MIT Classics Archive (complete Dryden translation of Plutarch’s Lives): http://classics.mit.edu/Browse/browse-Plutarch.html

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plutarch/



Monday, 16 January 2012

America, Greece and a World on Fire


Gideon Rachman wrote a truly excellent article in the Financial Times today entitled America, Greece and a World on Fire. The article reviews the role of the United States in declaring the Truman Doctrine in 1947 as a result of the Greek Civil War, which led to the Marshall Plan for Europe. It contrasts the fact that at present, European leadership of the Greek debt crisis has proved extremely disappointing.

An extract is below: please check the link for the full article.

“It took an economic crisis in Greece in 1947 to force the United States to assume world leadership. Now, more than 60 years later, another Greek crisis is showing what the world feels like without US leadership.

In February 1947 the British government – bankrupted by the war and beset by a harsh winter – told America that it could no longer afford to aid Greece, which was on the brink of economic collapse and civil war. A British diplomatic cable at the time recorded a belief in Washington that “no time must be lost in plucking the torch of world leadership from our hands”.

President Truman went before Congress and requested $400m in aid for Greece, pledging that America would now “support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation”. A few weeks later, the US announced the Marshall Plan – a huge programme of financial aid, aimed at stabilising the whole of western Europe.

The contrast between then and now is stark. Once again, an economic crisis that began in Greece is threatening Europe. But this time there is no question of America assuming the central role in the management of the crisis.”

Financial Times – 16 January 2012

Sunday, 15 January 2012

The Troika, the Reform Programme and the Missing Labour Reserve



The other news from Greece this past week was the fact that the phantom labour reserve programme was officially shelved.

Minister of Administrative Reform Dimitris Reppas announced on Tuesday, 10 January that the labour reserve policy “bordered on the absurd and the ridiculous.” This policy, designed to place 30,000 public sector workers in a 12-month “labour reserve” at 60% of their pay, was designed under former Prime Minister George Papandreou as a means of avoiding, or at least minimizing the impact, of public sector cutbacks.

Minister Reppas further stated that firings of public sector personnel were not on his agenda. As quoted by Kathimerini’s English edition:

“We did not expect anything significant from a fiscal aspect and on the other hand there was the danger of public administration being unable to operate because of the loss of key personnel,” he said.

At the same time, Greece has clearly committed to downsizing the public sector by 150,000 workers by 2015.

So far, it is estimated by various sources that up to 10,000 public sector workers were placed in the “labour reserve” in 2011. Other sources claim that in fact many of these people claimed early retirement. Yet other sources say that the number of people placed in the reserve were in fact far less – on the order of 1,500 – 2,000 people.

While I share certain misgivings as to the efficiency of the labour reserve scheme, it is hard to underestimate just how much of an operational and public relations disaster this is for the Greek government.

On the one hand, Greece has committed to the labour reserve scheme since early 2011. This is the first step of a far larger public sector cutback.

Yet on the other hand, Minister Reppas is on public record disparaging the entire scheme, and abandoning it.

This clearly indicates that PASOK is still not behind the “reform” effort it has put it signature to, and indeed, has for the most part crafted. And apparently, Prime Minister Papademos is unable to enforce any sort of collective discipline on the matter.

Yet the commitments were made. If they were not the right commitments, they should have been refused at the time of their agreement. Not agreed to, and then rejected over one year later. This is otherwise known as hypocrisy.

With the Troika visiting Athens, I expect one or more of the following scenarios to unfold in the next few weeks:

a.     There is a strong chance that the Troika will break off the monitoring visit over lack of progress, repeating the scenario seen in August/September 2011. This will create yet another delay, exacerbated by the delay in agreeing to the PSI conditions.

b.     Prime Minister Papademos will force the restructuring the cabinet, removing certain “deep PASOK” ministers and installing “technocrats” in their place.

c.     Prime Minister Papademos threatens to resign, or resigns, on the lack of support for his premiership, and for the agreements that Greece itself has signed and agreed to implement. An election is then held, creating yet another self-destructive round of politicking and delay.

The self-destructive tendencies of the Greek political class should be manifest to everyone. Unfortunately, they threaten to drag everyone else in Greece down with them.


Related Post:

December 19, 2011


© Philip Ammerman, 2012